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Posted by: | Posted on: November 7, 2018

Hun Sen’s power paradox

Op-Ed: EastAsiaForum

Hun Sen’s power paradox

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen is continuing to push the limits of personal power consolidation. While his strategies have been highly successful so far, they are likely to result in greater political insecurity in Cambodia.

Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen addresses the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly at UN headquarters in New York, the United States, 28 September 2018 (Photo: Reuters/Eduardo Munoz).

Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen addresses the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly at UN headquarters in New York, the United States, 28 September 2018 (Photo: Reuters/Eduardo Munoz).

Several concerning developments have emerged in 2018. Since the Supreme Court banned the main opposition party — the Cambodia National Rescue Party, or CNRP — in November 2017, Hun Sen has further consolidated his power by appointing family members to top government positions.

Some of these promotions were of his children. For instance, in late 2017 Hun Sen appointed his third son, Hun Manith, as General Director of the General Directorate of Intelligence, a new intelligence unit designed to train spies for combat against terrorists and any suspected threat from ‘revolutionary’ forces. Hun Sen also promoted his son-in-law, Dy Vichea — former head of the Ministry of Interior’s Central Security Department — to Deputy Chief of the National Police. Most importantly, Hun Sen elevated his eldest son Lieutenant General Hun Manet as a General (four star) following his promotion to Deputy Commander in Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF).

These tactical moves are part of the Prime Minister’s long-term strategy to consolidate power, which has been in place since he removed his then co-prime minister, Norodom Ranariddh, from power in July 1997. Hun Sen has used coercive means to tighten political control over state institutions and co-opt loyal followers. Hun Sen now maintains tight control over the judiciary and electoral processes at both the local and national level and his party, the Cambodian People Party (CPP), dominates the bicameral legislature.

Why has Hun Sen carried out these tactical moves? For some commentators, they are simply a part of Cambodia’s entrenched political culture of authoritarianism, nepotism and patrimonialism. While there is some truth to this way of looking at Cambodian politics, it overlooks Cambodian leaders’ deep sense of insecurity, which drives them to weaken opposition forces by all means necessary. Hun Sen has been comparatively more successful than past Cambodian leaders in consolidating power, and is continuing to expand his domination of Cambodian politics after more than three decades.

Despite this success, Hun Sen still appears to feel insecure. His efforts to fill top government positions with family members are not simply about building a family business empire but rather about shutting down potential threats from within and without. This may explain why Hun Sen maintains a bodyguard unit of up to 6000 well-equipped and highly-paid troops.

Hun Sen’s sense of political vulnerability is also reflected in the words of Hun Manith, who reportedly said that the new General Directorate of Intelligence was designed to deal with ‘internal and external disturbance from a hostile and ill-intended group of people’ and that ‘the political and security situation and competition in the future will be more intense than in previous years’.

But Hun Sen is making the same mistake of the many Cambodian leaders before him: maximising political security by endlessly consolidating power. Hun Sen appears to believe that this strategy will continue to work for him. The problem with this strategy, though, may emerge from Cambodia’s external environment.

Hun Sen has taken advantage of the post-Cold War peace dividend and is also enjoying growing support from China. But he runs the risk of over-relying on Beijing’s support. The extent to which China is prepared to protect the CPP is difficult to determine, but what is clear is Chinese leaders’ long history of abandoning their allies when much was at stake. While Hun Sen may be aware of this possibility, his strategy to weaken domestic political challenges may increase his political insecurity.

Another problem with power consolidation through nepotism or patrimonialism is that it tends to invite resistance and opposition from both within the party and without. At some point, forces opposed to Hun Sen will grow stronger and nastier, especially if an economic downturn hits the country. And if Western democracies begin to impose sanctions on Cambodia, not only will ordinary Cambodians suffer, but the ruling elite will also face a legitimacy crisis. In this scenario, the CPP is likely to resort to even more repressive violence and may even end up self-imploding.

Current and future Cambodian leaders need to realise that security maximisation through unrestrained power consolidation is counterproductive and dangerous. Security does not necessarily result from others’ insecurity. But for this to happen would require CPP leaders to shift from a self-serving strategy to one that considers the security of others through effective dialogue and democratic power sharing.

Sorpong Peou is a Professor with the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson University, Toronto.

Posted by: | Posted on: October 8, 2018

លិខិតចំហរ

លិខិតចំហរ

ខ្ញុំព្រះករុណាអាត្មាភាព-យើងខ្ញុំក្នុងនាមសមាជិកស្ថាបនាក៏ដូចជាសមាជិកប្រតិបត្តិនិងសមាជិកទូទៅទាំងអតីតនិងបច្ចុប្បន្ននៃសមាគមខេមរនិស្សិតនៃសកលវិទ្យាល័យមហាចុឡាឡុងកនរាជាវិទ្យាល័យមានការសោកស្តាយដោយភាពមិនច្បាស់លាស់នៃការចាត់រៀបចំពិធីបុណ្យភ្ជុំបិណ្ឌប្រពៃណីខ្មែរខាងមុខរបស់សមាគមនៅថ្ងៃទី៧ ខែតុលា ឆ្នាំ២០១៨នៅវត្តស្រីសុដារាមក្នុងទីក្រុងបាងកក។ តាមលិខិតរបស់សមាគមខេមរនិស្សិតគឺសមាគមជាអ្នករៀបចំបុណ្យភ្ជុំបិណ្ឌនេះ ប៉ុន្តែទៅជារាជទូតកម្ពុជាប្រចាំទីក្រុងបាងកកចេញសំបុត្រថាខ្លួនជាអ្នករៀបចំឬម្ចាស់បុណ្យទៅវិញ។ នៅក្នុងវារៈលំអិតនៃវិធីបុណ្យ ក៏សង្កេតឃើញរដ្ឋមន្ត្រីក្រសួងការងារនិងមុខវិជ្ជាជីវៈរបស់កម្ពុជានឹងមកចូលរួមផងដែរ។ (សូមពិនិត្យមើលលិខិតភ្ជាប់មកជាមួយនេះស្រាប់)

សូមបញ្ជាក់ថាសមាគមខេមរៈនិស្សិតនេះជាសមាគមក្រៅរដ្ឋាភិបាលចំណុះអោយសាកលវិទ្យាល័យ។ ស្ថាប័ននេះជាស្ថាប័នសមណៈនិស្សិតខ្មែរដែលជាបណ្ឌិតបញ្ញវន្តដែលបានបញ្ចប់ការសិក្សា កំពុងសិក្សា និងមានមកបន្តការសិក្សាខាងមុខ។ លក្ខន្តិកៈរបស់សមាគមគឺឈររឹងមាំលើការបំពេញតាមគោលបំណងរបស់ខ្លួនដើម្បីជំរុញភាពជោគជ័យនៃការសិក្សារៀនសូត្រ មានក្រមសីលធម៍ មានវិជ្ជាជីវៈ និងជាក្រុមបច្ចេកទេសសុទ្ធសាធ ហើយមិនពាក់ព័ន្ធក្នុងការបំរើបក្សនយោបាយណាមួយឡើយ។

ដើម្បីតំរង់ទិសរបស់យើងប្រកបដោយសតិសម្បជ្ជញ្ញៈនិងនិរន្តរភាពស្ថាប័ន ខ្ញុំព្រះករុណាអាត្មាភាព-យើងខ្ញុំ សូមថ្កោលទោសបុគ្គលឬក្រុមណាដែលយកសមាគមទៅពាក់ព័ន្ធបំរើបក្សនយោបាយ និងបក្សនយោបាយដែលឆ្លៀតយកអត្ថប្រយោជន៍ពីសមាគមទៅបំរើមហិច្ឆតានយោបាយរបស់ខ្លួនតាមទំនើងចិត្ត។ សូមបញ្ជាក់ថាក្រុមបច្ចេកទេស ពិតជាមានទំងន់និងតំលៃខ្ពស់ជាងក្រុមអ្នកនយោបាយនៅគ្រប់សម័យកាលទាំងអស់ក្នុងការអភិវឌ្ឍន៍សង្គម។

ថ្ងៃ១១រោច ខែអស្សុជ ឆ្នាំច សំរិទ្ធិស័ក ព.ស. ២៥៦១

ថ្ងៃទី៥ ខែតុលា ឆ្នាំ២០១៨

 

Open Letter

We are founding members as well as leadership members and general members, in the past and present, of the Khemara Student Association of Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University have disappointed on the conflicting invitation of Pchum Ben Khmer ceremony which will be conducted this October 7, 2018 at Sri Sodaram Monastery in Bangkok. According to the invitation of the Association, the Association is the host of this event. But Royal Embassy of Cambodia in Bangkok issued their own invitation confirming that Embassy is the host of the event. In the detailed agenda, Minister of Labor and Vocational Training of Cambodia will attend the ceremony as well. (Please see the invitations attached herewith).

We would like to affirm that Khemara Student Association is the non-governmental organization under the provision of the University. This institution is the institution of Buddhist monks who are intellectuals and scholars whom graduated, are current students, and are prospective students. The bylaw of the Association has stood firm on accomplishing the objectives of the Association to further learning success, aware of code of ethic, professionalism, and we are purely technical group, and this Association shall never involve serving any political party.

To move towards our goal with consciousness and sustainability of the institution, we are condemning any individual or group who are using the Association to serve the political party, and political party that exploits the Association for their own political ambition. We would like to confirm that technical groups are genuinely pertaining heavier weight and more invaluable than those of politician groups in developing a society.

จดหมาย

เราเป็นสมาชิกผู้ก่อตั้งรวมถึงสมาชิกผู้นำและสมาชิกทั่วไปในอดีตและปัจจุบันของสมาคมนักเรียน Khemara มหาวิทยาลัยมหาจุฬาลงกรณราชวิทยาลัยรู้สึกผิดหวังกับคำเชิญที่ขัดแย้งกันของพิธี Pchum Ben Khmer ซึ่งจะจัดขึ้นในวันที่ 7 ตุลาคม 2018 ที่วัดศรีสุพาราม ในกรุงเทพฯ ตามคำเชิญของสมาคม สมาคมเป็นเจ้าภาพจัดงานนี้ แต่สถานเอกอัครราชฑูตกัมพูชาในกรุงเทพฯได้ออกหนังสือเชิญตัวเองว่าเป็นเจ้าภาพจัดงานดังกล่าว ។ รัฐมนตรีว่าการกระทรวงแรงงานและอาชีวศึกษากัมพูชาจะเข้าร่วมพิธีด้วยเช่นกัน (โปรดดูคำเชิญที่แนบมาพร้อมนี้)។

เราอยากจะยืนยันว่า Khemara Student Association เป็นองค์กรที่อยู่ในความดูแลของมหาวิทยาลัย។ สถาบันนี้เป็นสถาบันของพระสงฆ์ที่เป็นปัญญาชนและนักวิชาการที่จบการศึกษา เป็นนักเรียนปัจจุบัน และเป็นนักเรียนในอนาคต។ ข้อบังคับของสมาคมมีความมุ่งมั่นในการบรรลุวัตถุประสงค์ของสมาคมต่อความสำเร็จในการเรียนรู้ การรับรู้ถึงทางจรรยาบรรณ ทางวิชาชีพ และเราเป็นกลุ่มทางเทคนิคอย่างหมดจด และสมาคมนี้จะไม่เกี่ยวข้องกับการให้บริการพรรคการเมืองใด ๆ។

เพื่อมุ่งสู่เป้าหมายของเราด้วยจิตสำนึกและความยั่งยืนของสถาบันเราประณามบุคคลหรือกลุ่มบุคคลใด ๆ ที่ใช้สมาคมเพื่อรับใช้พรรคการเมืองและพรรคการเมืองที่ใช้ประโยชน์จากสมาคมเพื่อจุดประสงค์ทางการเมืองของตนเอง เราต้องการยืนยันว่ากลุ่มเทคนิคมีน้ำหนักที่หนักกว่าและมีคุณค่ามากขึ้นกว่ากลุ่มนักการเมืองในการพัฒนาสังคม។

October 5, 2018

Open Letter-page-001 Open Letter-page-002 Open Letter-page-004 Open Letter-page-005

 

Posted by: | Posted on: October 8, 2018

Cambodia’s Hun Sen defiant despite EU trade threat

Op-Ed: Reuters

Cambodia’s Hun Sen defiant despite EU trade threat

PHNOM PENH (Reuters) – Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen has taken a defiant stance following a European Union announcement last week that it would ramp up trade pressure on Cambodia over human rights concerns.

NEC reform

The European Union (EU) told Cambodia on Friday it will lose its special access to the world’s largest trading bloc, and said it was considering similar trade sanctions for Myanmar, adding that it was ready to punish human rights abuses in both countries.

The EU warned that it had launched a six-month review of Cambodia’s duty-free access to the EU, meaning garments, sugar and other exports could face tariffs within 12 months.

Speaking to Cambodian students on Sunday as part of a trip to Japan to attend a regional meeting, Hun Sen said Cambodia must defend its sovereignty. Hun Sen has held power for three decades.

“No matter what measures they want to take against Cambodia, in whatever way, Cambodia must be strong in its defense of its sovereignty,” Hun Sen said during a speech to students in Tokyo shared on his Facebook page on Sunday.

“I say it again and again: don’t exchange national sovereignty with aid, don’t exchange the peace of the country with aid,” he said.

He did not specifically comment on how the removal of trade privileges could impact exports.

The EU warned Cambodia in July that it could lose its special trade status after a general election that month returned Prime Minister Hun Sen to power.

Rights groups said the election was not fair because of the lack of a credible opposition, among other reasons.

The main opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) was dissolved by the country’s Supreme Court at the government’s request last year and did not take part in the election.

Many CNRP leaders have fled abroad and are in living in self-imposed exile.

Cambodia’s exports to the European Union were worth 5 billion euros ($5.8 billion) last year, according to EU data, up from negligible levels less than a decade ago.

Cambodia’s textile, garments and footwear industry are vital to its economy. Around 40 percent of its GDP comes from garment exports.

The garments sector employs more than 800,000 workers. The EU and U.S. are the country’s primary markets for exports, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Reuters was unable to reach three workers’ unions for reaction on Monday. A government spokesman, Phay Siphan, was also unavailable to comment.

Cambodia is marking a national holiday from Monday to Wednesday this week with many offices closed.

Additional reporting and writing by Amy Sawitta Lefevre in BANGKOK; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore

Posted by: | Posted on: September 12, 2018

European Parliament resolution on Cambodia, notably the case of Kem Sokha, EBA and UNs

Official reference source: European Parliament

European Parliament resolution on Cambodia, notably the case of Kem Sokha (2018/2842(RSP))
The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Cambodia, in particular those of 14 September 2017(1) and 14 December 2017(2),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions on Cambodia of 26 February 2018,

–  having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS) of 30 July 2018 on the general elections in Cambodia,

–  having regard to the evaluation mission of the Commission and the EEAS to Cambodia of 5 to 11 July 2018,

–  having regard to the 2008 EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders,

–  having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of the EEAS of 16 November 2017 on the dissolution of the Cambodian National Rescue Party,

–  having regard to the 1997 Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Cambodia,

–  having regard to the local EU statement of 22 February 2017 on the political situation in Cambodia, and the statements by the spokesperson of the EU Delegation of 25 August 2017 and 3 September 2017 on restrictions of political space in Cambodia,

–  having regard to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 36/32 of 29 September 2017 and the Report of the Secretary-General of 2 February 2018,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarians and the decisions of the Governing Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union of March 2018,

–  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/144 of 8 March 1999 on the right and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms,

–  having regard to the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, in which a commitment to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia, including on the part of international signatories, is enshrined in Article 15,

–  having regard to the International Labour Organisation Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise,

–  having regard to the Cambodian Constitution, in particular Article 41 thereof, in which the rights and freedoms of expression and assembly are enshrined, Article 35 on the right to political participation and Article 80 on parliamentary immunity,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

–  having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 3 September 2017, Kem Sokha, the President of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), was arrested, and whereas on 16 November 2017, the Supreme Court announced the dissolution of the CNRP, at the end of a one-day hearing; whereas the Supreme Court has also banned 118 CNRP politicians from being politically active for five years;

B.  whereas the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) obtained 100 % of the contested seats in the National Assembly election held on 29 July 2018 and in the Senate election held on 25 February 2018;

C.  whereas the right to political participation is enshrined in Article 35 of the Cambodian Constitution; whereas the amended 2017 Law on Political Parties includes numerous restrictions on the participation of opposition parties, including the dissolution of parties if its leaders have a criminal record;

D.  whereas the 2018 elections in Cambodia were de facto non-competitive and failed to meet minimum international standards for democratic elections; whereas the European Union and the United States of America suspended their financial assistance to the Cambodian National Election Committee and declined to observe the elections;

E.  whereas the decision to dissolve the CNRP was a significant step towards the creation of an authoritarian state; whereas the political structure of Cambodia can no longer be considered a democracy;

F.  whereas the Cambodian Government took wide-ranging measures to ensure that the ruling CPP would run virtually unopposed in the elections for both the Senate and the National Assembly;

G.  whereas, following his arrest on 3 September 2017, Kem Sokha was charged with treason under Article 443 of the Cambodian Criminal Code, despite his parliamentary immunity; whereas statements by the Cambodian Government jeopardised his right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence; whereas he faces up to 30 years in prison if found guilty; whereas the President of the Court, Dith Munty, is a member of the standing committee of the ruling party;

H.  whereas on 28 August 2018, the Cambodian authorities released 14 members of the CNRP after they had received a royal pardon; whereas this pardon is linked to the releases granted to half a dozen activists and journalists;

I.  whereas Kem Sokha was detained without trial for more than one year; whereas the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared Mr Sokha’s pre-trial detention to be ‘arbitrary’ and ‘politically motivated’; whereas he was released on bail on 10 September 2018; whereas he is unable to leave the vicinity of his house and is not allowed to communicate with other members of the opposition or the media;

J.  whereas the arrest and detention of Kem Sokha occurred amid widespread and systematic repression of political and electoral rights in Cambodia; whereas there has been a steady increase in the number of cases of arrest and detention of members of the political opposition and political commentators; whereas the previous President of the CNRP, Sam Rainsy, was convicted of criminal defamation and now lives in exile;

K.  whereas the Cambodian authorities have also cracked down on journalists and reporters covering the attacks on the opposition parties; whereas 69‑year‑old award-winning filmmaker James Ricketson is one of the victims of these attacks on the media; whereas Mr Ricketson was arrested for flying a drone over an opposition party rally in June 2017; whereas Mr Ricketson has been sentenced to six years in prison in the capital, Phnom Penh, on charges of espionage;

L.  whereas there has been a severe crackdown on the independent media; whereas social media networks have also come under attack; whereas in May, the Government issued a regulation restricting the rights to freedom of expression, press and publication and empowering the Government to police social media networks to uncover and silence online dissent in Cambodia;

M.  whereas trade unionists, human rights activists and civil society organisations are operating in an increasingly restricted space in Cambodia and face harassment, acts of intimidation and arbitrary arrest; whereas the 2015 amended Law on Association and Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO) severely restricts freedom of association and expression, including by establishing government control and censorship over the work of NGOs; whereas the Trade Union Law restricts freedom of association and creates unnecessary obstacles and burdens in relation to registration procedures and the operations of trade unions;

N.  whereas five human rights defenders affiliated with the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), Nay Vanda, Ny Sokha, Yi Soksan, Lim Mony, and Ny Chakrya, face charges of bribing a witness and being an accomplice to bribery of a witness; whereas the five human rights defenders spent 14 months in pre-trial detention before their release on bail;

O.  whereas Cambodia benefits from the most favourable regime available under the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), namely the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme; whereas the EU has allocated up to EUR 410 million to Cambodia for development cooperation for the financial period 2014-2020, of which EUR 10 million is for supporting the electoral reform process in Cambodia and is currently suspended;

P.  whereas the UN Secretary‑General recalled in his July statement that an inclusive and pluralistic political process remains essential for safeguarding the progress made by Cambodia in consolidating peace;

Q.  whereas conflicts over sugar plantations have not yet been resolved; whereas there is continuing concern about evictions from land, persistent impunity for such acts and the dire situation of the affected communities; whereas the Government of Cambodia has not signed up to the EU Terms of Reference for the Sugar Cane Audit Process;

1.  Notes that Kem Sokha was released from prison on bail under strict conditions; denounces the fact that Kem Sokha has been placed under house arrest; calls for all charges against Kem Sokha to be dropped and for his immediate and full release; calls, furthermore, for other politically motivated charges and rulings against opposition politicians, including Sam Rainsy, to be dropped immediately;

2.  Is worried about the condition of Kem Sokha’s health, and calls on the Cambodian authorities to allow him to receive appropriate medical treatment; asks the Government to allow Kem Sokha to meet foreign diplomats, UN officials and human rights observers;

3.  Expresses its conviction that the elections in Cambodia cannot be considered to be free and fair; expresses serious concerns at the conduct and results of the 2018 elections in Cambodia, which failed to produce a credible process and were widely condemned by the international community;

4.  Calls on the Cambodian Government to work towards strengthening democracy and the rule of law and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, which includes fully complying with the constitutional provisions on pluralism and freedom of association and expression; calls, furthermore, on the Cambodian Government to repeal all recent amendments to the Constitution, the Penal Code, the Law on Political Parties, the Trade Union Law, the Law on NGOs and all other pieces of legislation limiting freedom of speech and political freedoms that are not fully in line with Cambodia’s obligations and international standards;

5.  Stresses that a credible democratic process requires an environment in which political parties, civil society and the media are able to carry out their legitimate roles without fear, threats or arbitrary restrictions; calls on the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that the dissolution of CNRP is swiftly reversed;

6.  Reiterates its call on the Cambodian Government to put an end to all forms of harassment, abuse and politically motivated criminal charges against members of the political opposition, human rights defenders, trade unionists and labour rights advocates, land rights and other civil society activists, and journalists, among others; calls on the Government of Cambodia to release, without delay, all citizens who have been detained for exercising their human rights, including James Ricketson, and to drop all charges against them;

7.  Supports the decision to suspend EU electoral support to Cambodia; recalls the national and international obligations in relation to democratic principles and fundamental human rights to which Cambodia has committed itself; urges the Cambodian Government to engage in reforms in order to advance democracy and apply internationally recognised minimum standards for future electoral processes, including the organisation of multiparty, free and fair elections, the establishment of a genuinely independent National Election Committee and the involvement of NGOs and the independent media in election monitoring and reporting;

8.  Reminds the Cambodian Government that it must fulfil its obligations and commitments in relation to the democratic principles and fundamental human rights, which are an essential component of the EU-Cambodia Cooperation Agreement and the conditions under EBA;

9.  Welcomes the recent EU EBA fact‑finding mission to Cambodia and invites the Commission to report the conclusions to Parliament as soon as possible; calls on the Commission to consider possible consequences in the context of the trade preferences Cambodia enjoys, including launching an investigation under the mechanisms provided for in the framework of EBA;

10.  Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to compile a list of individuals responsible for the dissolution of the opposition and other serious human rights violations in Cambodia with a view to imposing possible visa restrictions and asset freezes on them;

11.  Calls on the Vice‑President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to closely monitor the situation in Cambodia; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to take action and lead the efforts at the forthcoming 39th session of the UN Human Rights Council towards the adoption of a strong resolution addressing the human rights situation in Cambodia;

12.  Calls on the Cambodian Government to renew the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Cambodia upon its expiry on 31 December 2018;

13.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and National Assembly of Cambodia.

EU on Kem Sokha 1 EU on Kem Sokha 2 EU on Kem Sokha 3Photos