Long Beach Cambodians-Americans lobby for tribunal

Posted by: | Posted on: May 31, 2011

Cal State Long Beach professor leading campaign to continue Khmer Rouge trials.

05/28/2011
By Greg Mellen, Staff Writer
Long Beach Press Telegram (California, USA)

Those who want to petition the ECCC to continue investigate can do so online at http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/cambodiansurvivorsseekjustice/

LONG BEACH — The four older Cambodian women walked along Anaheim Street and greeted passersby and talked with a sense of purpose to shop owners.
Refugee women survivors of the Khmer Rouge genocide, are not typically known for such forthright and outward displays, but here they were united and strong.
The four women, accompanied by local activist and Cal State Long Beach professor
Leakhena Nou, were out to rally support among the immigrant community and pass out petitions to urge a tribunal court in their home country to press forward with prosecutions of alleged perpetrators of atrocities.

The effort by the women, whose names are being withheld for their protection, comes in the wake of growing indications that the United Nations-backed court will close down after its upcoming trial slated to begin in late June.
While two cases are pending with five unnamed defendants, progress has
stalled in the face of Cambodian government opposition.
But that hasn’t stopped the U.S. women from insisting on being heard.
“These women embodied the quest for justice,” Nou said. “They know the court may reject them but they wanted to to fight the fight, not only for a symbolic purpose but for future generations.”
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CLOSING ORDER of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010

Posted by: | Posted on: May 31, 2011
CLOSING ORDER
of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010
V. MILITARY STRUCTURE
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF KAMPUCHEA
  • 113.           The Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (“RAK”) was a core institution within the CPK governed Democratic Kampuchea.337 CPK policy relied heavily on the implementation of is goals by forceful means, making the military an important part of its government apparatus. From the outset, the CPK considered that “for self-defense and self-liberation it is imperative to use violence, whether political violence or armed violence. It is imperative that the people be armed, that is, there must be an army … in order to defend the people, to defend the revolution, and to go on the offensive to counter-attack the enemy”.338
  • 114.           The CPK asserted that its armed forces originated in “a Secret Defence Unit.339 By 1968 these forces had been upgraded into “armed guerrilla units”.340 17 January 1968 marks the official launch of an armed struggle and the birth of the CPK “revolutionary army”.341 According to the official line of the Party, by 1969 “the preconditions for an army were already there …In some locations, in the major Zones, there were already companies, many units, platoons, squads, teams. Other locations had just platoons, squads, and teams. However, those forces were the ranks of a Revolutionary Army!”.342 In March 1970, the latter was officially designated as the “Cambodian People’s National Liberation Armed Forces” (CPNLAF).

Closing order of case 002 (continue…)

Posted by: | Posted on: May 27, 2011
CLOSING ORDER
of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010

IV. COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE

  • 72.               The CPK Standing Committee was at the top of the Party’s nation-wide communications. It was at the centre of a system of constant information between each part of the administrative hierarchy. It issued the instructions: “Send general reports through various spearheads. Propose short reports by telegram, (all this so) the Standing Committee knows the situation in order to provide timely instructions”.206

A. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

  • 73.               The channels of communication were meticulously organized at the level of the Centre (among ministries and offices around the Centre, within the Centre armed forces and within the Centre’s S-21 security apparatus); between the Centre and the zones (with no inter-zone communication allowed); and between zones and sectors. Communication between sectors and districts depended on available means, but was less formalized.
Communication Within the Centre
  • 74.               The distribution of messages that arrived at the Centre from outside entities was coordinated by Office K-1, where it was decided which of the leaders were to receive copies of messages which were subsequently delivered to them.207 This decision was taken by Pol Pot and his staff, who for this purpose received ingoing messages several times per day.208 According to one witness, Nuon Chea always received a copy of the messages Pol Pot had read.209
  • 75.               There was also frequent written communication between individual CPK leaders, most notably between Pol Pot and Nuon Chea, who used to exchange letters every one or two days.210

Zone to Centre Communication

  • 76.               Zones and autonomous sectors reported to the Standing Committee primarily on the agricultural situation, such as the rice harvest and on irrigation systems, the livelihood of the people and the enemy and military situation.211Secretary of Autonomous Sector 105) mentions that he sent telegrams to the Centre and that Pol Pot would send comments back to him about the arrests of cadres and about confessions.212

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Closing order of cases 002 (Nuon Chea, Kieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith) continue…

Posted by: | Posted on: May 26, 2011
CLOSING ORDER
of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010
III. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES (NATIONAL)
  • 58.               Below the level of the Centre, Democratic Kampuchea was sub-divided into a series of hierarchical administrative entities, all reporting up a vertical chain-of-command, culminating at the Centre. Immediately below the Centre were a number of large “zones”. They were sub­divided into “sectors” with each of these containing a number of “districts” within which were a series of “subdistricts” and “cooperatives”.184 At each level, the zone, sector, district and subdistrict tiers of this national structure were each governed by a committee, each of which was headed by a secretary.185
  • 59.              Immediately after April 1975 there were six zones; North Zone, Northwest Zone, Northeast Zone, Southwest Zone, West Zone and East Zone.186 In 1977, the North Zone was renamed the Central Zone187 and a new North Zone was created.
  • 60.               In addition to the zones which reported directly to the Centre, the CPK created a number of “autonomous sectors” which bypassed the zone level to report directly to the Centre. These were Autonomous Sector 103 (Preah Vihear), Autonomous Sector 105 (Mondulkiri), Autonomous Sector 106 (Siem Reap), Autonomous Sector 505 (Kratie) and the Kampong Som Autonomous City (Cambodia’s principal Seaport).188 In addition, Phnom Penh itself was categorized as a distinct territory not within the formal national administrative structures, which reported directly to the Centre.189 Autonomous Sector 106 (Siem Reap) was merged with Autonomous Sector 103 (Preah Vihear) to create the New North Zone in 1977.190
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