Cambodia China Relations

now browsing by tag

 
 
Posted by: | Posted on: January 19, 2019

Interview: Senior Pentagon Official Visits Cambodia, Talks Phnom Penh Ties, Indo-Pacific Strategy

Interview: Senior Pentagon Official Visits Cambodia, Talks Phnom Penh Ties, Indo-Pacific Strategy

19 January 2019

US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, Joseph H Felter paid a two-day visit in Cambodia, from January 15-16, 2019 to strengthen military ties between United States and Cambodia. (Ky Mengly/VOA Khmer)
US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, Joseph H Felter paid a two-day visit in Cambodia, from January 15-16, 2019 to strengthen military ties between United States and Cambodia. (Ky Mengly/VOA Khmer)

“Bilateral defense ties have undergone drastic setbacks over the past few years amid Cambodia’s growing closer security ties with China and political tensions surrounding Cambodia’s general elections last year.”PHNOM PENH — 

Listen the entire interviewing translated in Khmer

[Editor’s Note: U.S. Department of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Southeast Asia Joseph H. Felter visited Cambodia this week to discuss the restoration of military cooperation with Cambodia. Bilateral defense ties have undergone drastic setbacks over the past few years amid Cambodia’s growing closer security ties with China and political tensions surrounding Cambodia’s general elections last year. The senior Pentagon official sat down in Phnom Penh on Wednesday with VOA Khmer to discuss defense ties with Cambodia and the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at dealing with China’s growing influence in the region.]

VOA: Can you tell us about this trip of yours to Cambodia?

Felter: That was special because this is my first trip to Cambodia in this capacity as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia. It was also the first time we had a senior-level defense talk in quite some time in Cambodia – defense dialogue which took place on Tuesday hosted by Gen. Neang Phat [Ministry of Defense secretary of state].

VOA: Who did you meet on the Cambodian side and what issues did you discuss?

Felter: On Tuesday I met with Gen. Neang Phat. He was hosting with his senior members from his staff from the Ministry of Defense and the Cambodian military. Just today, we visited Ream Naval Base and met with Vice Admiral Ouk Seiha, commander of the base, and his staff.

VOA: Can you tell us what issues you raised with Cambodian officials?

Felter: Gen. Neang Phat is the secretary of state of the Ministry of National Defense. As part of the Defense Policy Dialogue, we discussed a range of issues like regional and international security, multilateral and bilateral cooperation. What I thought to be the most important part of our discussion on Tuesday with the Defense Policy Dialogue was mapping out a way forward to improve and enhance military-to-military cooperation between the United States and Cambodia to identify a way we can improve our defense ties and military cooperation.

VOA: We have seen many joint activities have been canceled due to the political situation in Cambodia. Have you brought this into discussions with Cambodian officials to find ways to restart them?

Felter: Yes, we have restarted on some levels. Encouragingly, Cambodia agreed to restart our POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/Missing in Action] cooperation and we find this very encouraging. Later this month we will have a joint on-field activity where we actually go out and do recovery operations of two missing pilots that we are searching for. So we find this very encouraging. Following this, we will be able to enhance our existing state partnership program. This is the partnership program with the Eisenhower National Guard that we will be sending many subject experts here to help the Cambodian military develop their peace-keeping skills. We know that Cambodia will participate in peace-keeping operations and missions around the world so we look forward to that. And there is a way forward beyond that. We will identify a number of activities that we can do to build on this military-to-military cooperation and enhance defense relationship. But to go down that path, we were clear in our discussion on Tuesday with Gen. Neang Phat that a number of things will have to happen on the Cambodian side that has to take initiative in areas of promoting national reconciliation, opening space for civil society and media. Some specific areas down that path include improving bilateral and multilateral exercises, restarting joint combined exchange training which we did in the past, the naval exercise CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training). Angkor Sentinel is another example.

VOA: Your call for release the of Kem Sokha, the opposition leader, is met with a negative response from Cambodian officials. What do you think about that?

Read More …
Posted by: | Posted on: January 16, 2018

Cambodia and China: Rewriting (and Repeating) History

Op-Ed: The Diplomat 

A lot has changed in 40 years — but not everything.

Chana's Premier Li Keqiang, center, shakes hands with his counterpart, Nguyen Xuan Phuc, second from left, of Vietnam,  Prayuth Chan-o-cha, left, of Thailand, Hun Sen, second from right, of Cambodia, and Thongloun Sisolith, right, of Laos, before an opening of the 2nd Mekong Lancang Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, in   Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Wednesday, Jan. 10, 2018. Leaders of nations along Southeast Asia's Mekong River gather Wednesday in the Cambodian capital amid a push by China to build more dams that are altering the water flow and have raised environmental concerns. (AP Photo/Heng Sinith)

Chana’s Premier Li Keqiang, center, shakes hands with his counterpart, Nguyen Xuan Phuc, second from left, of Vietnam, Prayuth Chan-o-cha, left, of Thailand, Hun Sen, second from right, of Cambodia, and Thongloun Sisolith, right, of Laos, before an opening of the 2nd Mekong Lancang Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Wednesday, Jan. 10, 2018. Leaders of nations along Southeast Asia’s Mekong River gather Wednesday in the Cambodian capital amid a push by China to build more dams that are altering the water flow and have raised environmental concerns. (AP Photo/Heng Sinith)

Like Pol Pot before him, Hun Sen has now pinned his political longevity on China, which again looks out at a visage of hostile powers across Asia as it seeks to rise to the status of the regional hegemon, and celebrates having a strong ally in Phnom Penh.

The Soviet threat is gone, but Hun Sen’s cantankerous political attacks on all things American in Cambodia, which has tied him to the Chinese for support, might be viewed in much the same way as Pol Pot’s attacks on Vietnam: it’s me, or a pawn of China’s great power rival du jour. 

Though Hun Sen never specified the precise hue of the “color revolution” brewing against him by Cambodia’ popular opposition party as he dismantled the country’s 25-year-old UN-built democracy late last year, his targets both in the opposition and in fragile civil society had a distinct American accent.

The 24-year-old U.S.-owned English-language newspaper-of-record, The Cambodia Daily, was forced to close — but not the Australian-owned Phnom Penh Post. Gone too were radio programs from the U.S.-run Voice of America and Radio Free Asia — along with two of their reporters, who were imprisoned for “espionage” — but not those of Radio France International.

Gone, even, was U.S.-funded National Democratic Institute — even as Germany’s Konrad Adanaeur Institute, which had been actively working with the opposition to develop policies, was left untouched. The message to China would have been clear.

Hun Sen is only the latest in a long line of Cambodian leaders to bank his leadership’s long-term survival and his legacy on the rise of China as the regional power.

Pol Pot, too, was not the first.

King Norodom Sihanouk, the father of Cambodia’s 1953 independence, also moved sharply toward China’s influence late in his rule. He went as far as to sever diplomatic ties with the U.S. in 1965, believing that the future in Asia was with China.

Pol Pot and King Sihanouk were notably both thwarted by competing interests from within their regimes — a pro-U.S. faction represented by the coup leader Lon Nol for Sihanouk in March 1970, and a pro-Vietnamese faction, with Hun Sen among the leaders, in the case of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge in January 1979.

Hun Sen may well yet prove to have bested both for timing in the China gambit. Yet as a self-proclaimed life-long student of history and geopolitics, he would be forgiven for looking around his party with apprehension.

Continue to read more….

Posted by: | Posted on: January 10, 2017

Cambodia Wants China as Its Neighborhood Bully

Op-Ed: Foreign Policy

Cambodia Wants China as Its Neighborhood Bully

Cambodia Wants China as Its Neighborhood Bully

In the closing months of 2016, all of Southeast Asia seemed to be pivoting toward China. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak was hailed as a “visionary leader” by fellow Malaysian politicians for “tilting to China.” Thailand agreed to build an arms-maintenance and production center for China’s People’s Liberation Army, and the president of the Philippines declared in a speech delivered in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People: “In this venue I announce my separation from the United States.”

Americans have been left to ask: What did we do wrong? What has caused the leaders of Southeast Asia to turn away from Washington and toward Beijing? It is tempting to look for the answer to these questions in the policies of the Obama or Xi administrations, or blame it on shifting fortunes in the balance of power. But focusing on the spectacle of Sino-American rivalry masks the dozens of smaller dramas and power plays that usually escape the attention of Western observers. Often it is these smaller conflicts of interest that drive lesser powers into the arms of the great ones.

There is no better example of this than Cambodia, one of the first countries in the region to openly align itself with China. Cambodia’s position became clear in 2012, when it prevented ASEAN from issuing a joint communiqué that mentioned the South China Sea. Long-standing Cambodian dictator Hun Sen has reaped many rewards for this decision: In October, China granted Cambodia $237 million in direct aid, $90 million in canceled debt, and an additional $15 million in military support. Yet there is more behind Cambodian support for China than the size of Beijing’s pocketbook. In the minds of many Cambodians, the most difficult geopolitical challenge facing their country is not balancing the demands of the United States and China, but managing its relationship with Vietnam, an undertaking that cannot be successful without Chinese cooperation.

Ethnic disharmony is not hard to spot in Southeast Asia, but few of its prejudices — outside of the Myanmese hatred toward the Rohingya, at least — can match the distrust and disgust the average Khmer feels toward the Vietnamese. Recall how conservative Americans talked about the Soviet Union at the height of communist power, add the way their counterparts in modern Europe discuss Arab immigration now, and then throw in a dash of the humiliation that marked Germany in interwar years, and then you might come close to getting a fair idea of how wild and vitriolic a force anti-Vietnamese rhetoric is in Cambodian politics.

Cambodians have not forgotten the centuries of warfare that led Vietnamese armies to pillage the Khmer heartland and strip away more than half of its territory. Cambodian nationalists still pine for Khmer krom (“Lower Khmer”), a term used to describe both the ethnic Khmer living outside Cambodia and the lands they inhabit.

Without the intervention of the French in the 1860s, which transformed Cambodia into a French protectorate and southern Vietnam into a French colony, Cambodia would have been totally swallowed by the Vietnamese maw. French imperialism brought peace, but not harmony: Relations between the two groups only worsened under colonial control, as the French gave the Vietnamese a privileged status, and imperial policy supported Vietnamese migration to the Cambodian heartland. The subsequent governments that came to power in post-colonial times — the Sisowath, Lon Nol, and Khmer Rouge regimes — relied on anti-Vietnamese rhetoric to legitimize their rule to the Cambodian people.

Historically informed Cambodians are quick to point out that the Khmer Rouge was a creation of the Viet Cong; the more conspiratorial of their countrymen insist that the Khmer Rouge’s massacres were directed by them as well. Conspiratorial or not, Cambodians remember that 150,000 Vietnamese soldiers invaded Cambodia in 1978 and then occupied their country as foreign conquerors for the next 10 years. Though that decade-long war was not entirely the fault of the Vietnamese (China, Thailand, and the United States would support their own armed proxies), the violence of Vietnam’s counterinsurgency operations slowly eroded what goodwill they had earned by removing the Khmer Rouge from power.

Read More …

Posted by: | Posted on: November 30, 2016

The border scheme and the controversial map between Cambodia and Vietnam

Recalling the Scheme:

Recently, the scene of Cambodia politics has shifted from violence-pro activities orchestrated by the Prime Minister’s Cabinet towards discussing sensitive issue each competitive political party is

Courtesy: Phnom Penh Post in Khmer Language

Courtesy: Phnom Penh Post in Khmer Language

challenging to draw attention from the public for election support. As the matter of fact, CNRP has been cornered by Prime Minister Hun Sen in many aspects: after CNRP MPs entered the Parliament building, the “culture of dialogue” was promoted between Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy by leaving Khem Sokha in limbo; but while this approach is not meaningful for Hun Sen, the violence habit did occur instantly such as pro-CPP violent demonstrators to oust Khem Sokha from first vice president of the Assembly, and the severe physical attack on two CNRP MP members namely Nhay Chamroeun and Kong Sophea; the use of court to convict and jail both top leaders: Sam Rainsy and Khem Sokha, and the continual measures to tightening the politics of threat towards all CNRP’s members.

While the political misbehaviour of Prime Minister and his Cabinet has been unable to be checked by the State’s institution, the mischievous actions don’t translate righteousness to Prime Minister at all in order to maintain his long term political career on behalf of CPP party chief as well as in front of millions of Cambodian voters who have been concerting towards “change” for this country through the power of “ballot”.

Engagement between the Youngs and the Olds in Cambodia:

Courtesy: Cambodia Daily

Courtesy: Cambodia Daily

While the technical issue of map has longed of its disarray on the border demarcation between Cambodia and Vietnam, as now it is appearing for a public stunt, the disclosure of private conversation between Hun Sen and Thy Sovantha aka petite advisor Prime Minister called during whatsapp chatting, has significantly overhauled the violence’s status quo and it has likely been attempted to be forgotten. The chatting was uncertain at the beginning but after more leaks have come to the public especially the chatting between Thy Sovantha with Hun Manith, son of Hun Sen who is holding special position in the government as FBI-like department, to organize force to topple and humiliate opposition’s leaders unlawfully, the online childish-like chit-chatting is assumed genuine. Through those lengthy chit-chatting, one could summarize the topics are from personal health check, to family members linkage, to plans of toppling and intimidating opponents, and to disbursing one million of dollars to cover up Thy Sovantha’s assigned tasks etc.

What is intriguing for the public and Cambodian observers is the chit-chatting between grandpa and grandchild sounds non-serious, nonsensical, and miscellaneously. But the outcomes from such miscellaneous has surely shivered the opponents on prospective violence that have been running unchecked by the State. As the secrete has embodied to the public, the action plans from this unlawful activity might be undeterred, and the youngs are visibly exploited by the olds at the highest.

Cambodia’s Border Scheme through lens of the Pragmatists, the Conservationists, and the Whistle-blowers:

Courtesy: RFA Khmer Service

Courtesy: RFA Khmer Service

After listening to RFA in Khmer services for their “call-in-show-forum” program (as recorded in youtube here), listeners might be serious, entertained, or sitting idle as usual. The five guests have expressed their diverse opinions among one is representing government (sic), and other four are representing non-governmental citizens; unfortunately, we didn’t have one official representation of the government to the show. With explicit ardent interrogative questions from the host, Mr. Chun Chanbot, Sam Rainsy who is president of the CNRP has exhibited his pragmatism into the issue more than other elses. His approach to always anticipating “dialogue” to keep the flame alive over all sensitive issues within Cambodian contexts. His firm stance on protecting Cambodia interests doesn’t mean he must reject other alternative scenarios.

The border’s scheme between Cambodia and Vietnam, like it or not, it has become a play full of fever audience, screaming, exploitation, and deadly consequences. For static conservationists, the great past of Cambodia must be revitalized while their actions and plans are not tabled to discuss on how and when we are going to achieve it. For whistle-blowers, the noisy street talkers are usual in their daily business, while the doers are always facing searing deadlock. As a leader of more than half of total country-population voters, Sam Rainsy has scrupulously stepped ahead many steps to ensure the boat is vital leading to “ballot” power in 2017 and 2018. In short, the triggering scenario from Prime Minister must be attentively conveyed although we don’t know how much PM has seriously studied on such proposal, but it is a politics which means so much on its consistent changing moment to always anchor the momentum. The agreement between Cambodia and Vietnam to propose legal map from France government to judge on all odds of border demarcation irregularities between the two states is heard from government’s rhetoric, but till today we have not seen any public note or transparency from such agreement. If government’s border-related department don’t disclose the agreement to officially request map from France, and if none of the other Cambodian parties have joint this task-force, the business of border politics is not different from those static conservationists and street talkers.

Cambodia needs a “complete one-package framework” to solve border scheme as well as to alter borderline politicization that has always hindered sustainable growth of Cambodia.