
Political Paradigm of Pragmatism from the Khmer Youth part 45

Op-Ed: ITI or Information and Technologies for International Development
Conclusion
Streams of politics, problems, and policies united to create the potential of an ICT in education reform in Cambodia. However, the failure to forge the political stream with the streams of problems and policies continues to hinder the mass adoption of this reform. The political stream has yet to be coupled with: the problems of stakeholders; the values of competing political coalitions; the resources available to competing goals, individuals, and policies; and the policies that support the ICT in education reform.
The present analysis has demonstrated that, as Cambodia progresses in planning and implementing the ICT in education policy, government policy makers would be advised to thoroughly plan the implementation process versus allowing implementation to be ad hoc. The current analysis indicated that to institutionalize the ICT in education reform, focus needs to be placed on the political stream. Based on the data presented above, a few conclusions and recommendations can be made for this reform’s implementation and evolution.
First, there is a need for the MoEYS to be proactive and develop an ICT in education action plan. It is understandable that the government is hesitant to commit funding and resources. However, if the government developed an inclusive, yet flexible, action plan, NGOs, IGOs, international lenders, local business, and local communities could better rise to the challenge and determine where best to put their resources and expertise. This need is linked with closely monitoring ICT in education projects to ensure all aspects of the action plan are addressed by the most competent institutions in the most efficient and effective manner possible.
Second, buttressed with the need for an action plan, is the need for the Cambodian government to pass anti-corruption legislation and thus increase the nation’s transparency. The risk of losing further aid and the possibility of paralyzing future ICT in education efforts is currently quite great. If Cambodia wants to be a global competitor, the government needs to adopt a culture of internationally accepted transparency, governance, and business ethics.
Third, the Cambodian government should distribute and support ICT infrastructure in the education system equitably and ethically in the short and long term. This infrastructure includes continued professional development of teachers, administrators, technology coordinators, and support personnel throughout the country. Internal inequality will erode social, ethical, and national ethos. To leapfrog out of a digital divide and become a global competitor, equity and social justice must be a guiding principle.
Fourth, if Cambodia is serious about an ICT in education reform, it must be willing to take daring risks. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2004) found that, as early as 1993, Cambodia became the first nation to have more mobile telephones than fixed lines. Wireless technology may be a viable alternative to the existing poorly wired-telephone infrastructure. Additionally, banning technologies such as 3G phones signals that the government is not fully prepared to accept the ramifications that access to information may bring.
Fifth, the MoEYS may need to focus on grassroots and community level information and education campaigns and advocacy. This will increase local stakeholder support and increase ownership of ICT enabled education reforms. Partnering with local government units, youth organizations, NGOs, and IGOs to affect demand for such reforms from the bottom up will only increase quality, sustainability, and scalability of ICT in education projects. These acts would ideally make the political stakeholders act together to realize the needed reforms.
Lastly, lessons learned from other countries should not be overlooked by Cambodian leaders. These leaders must determine the implications of ICT in education, remain focused on the infrastructure of rural and urban communities, proactively build capacity, energetically develop indigenous language and content, remain cognizant of costs, and focus on reasonable expectations. The nation of Cambodia has experienced major trials and tribulations. From its height of power in the Angkorian era to its decline during the reign of the Khmer Rouge, the nation has experienced many successes and challenges. The challenges that exist today are not for political power, but for knowledge and innovation. Improving the education system in Cambodia to meet the future needs of a global society is perhaps the most pressing need for this nation. The present analysis has shown that ICT in education may be part of the solution, but only if the reform is implemented through a competent, responsible, and proactive approach that unites streams of policy, problems, and politics. ■
ICT = Information and Communications Technologies
All these are just part of Cambodian education version that has no deep knowledge about the impact on students in a long term human resources building. Psychologically speaking, students have lost self-confidence that could help to produce self-correction and self-realization. Students are eagerly waiting others to enforce them. In term of law enforcement, students should not be the target. Those violated the traffic lights should be paid attention more than students who have learnt to gain knowledge, not to pass the exam without having knowledge.
There is an impertinent question I have always wanted to ask Sam Rainsy, leader of Cambodia’s opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) contesting this weekend’s elections. Why exactly did you name your previous political party after yourself? The answer to the question comes on page 98 of his new memoir, a personally revealing and persuasive book that bears the somewhat silly title of We Didn’t Start the Fire: My Struggle for Democracy in Cambodia.
It was March 1998, a volatile time in Phnom Penh, especially for activists and opposition members mindful of the previous year’s bloody coup and political violence. In 1997, Rainsy, then head of the Khmer Nation Party – which was founded in 1995 after he broke with the ineffectual royalists of Funcinpec – had survived a grenade attack that killed almost 20 people.
The opposition accused prime minister Hun Sen’s security forces of the attack. But the following year Rainsy found himself the target of an altogether different type of assault: copyright infringement. In Rainsy’s telling, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) had created a breakaway faction to counter-claim the “Khmer Nation Party” name. With the 1998 national elections looming, the courts would not make a decision on who rightfully owned the name before the polls, and Rainsy believes the delay was meant to sow confusion among voters who wanted to support him.
“This left us with no choice. Sam Rainsy was the only name that couldn’t be stolen,” he writes, quick to add the answer that pops up in any reader’s mind. “The fact that the party was named after me was not intended to imply a cult of personality.”
He had no choice. Much of Rainsy’s life, as told in this memoir, has this inexorable quality to it. He stepped up when no one else would step up. He filled the role of reformer when others in public life cowered in fear.
In recounting his youth, at least, this narrative has a ring of truth to it. His political education started early. Shortly after Cambodia’s independence in 1953, then-King Norodom Sihanouk abdicated the throne in favor of his father to establish the political movement Sangkum Reasr Niyum. In the 1950s, Rainsy’s father, Sam Sary (in Cambodia, family names come first and given names last), went from a judgeship to holding several ministerial positions. Eventually, he moved into Sihanouk’s inner circle.
However, the relationship didn’t last long. Sihanouk and Sary, to put it mildly, didn’t see eye to eye. Sihanouk brooked little dissent in his regime, and he “routinely used murder and repression against his opponents”, Rainsy writes. In a 1955 referendum, voters were asked, according to Rainsy’s recounting, to pick between a white ballot and a black one. White if they loved Sihanouk; black, well, you get the point.
He took home a laughable 925,667 votes, while a mere 1,834 opposed. “Readers are asked to judge for themselves how much has changed in the intervening decades,” Rainsy writes. A continuing theme of the book is that each successive regime has built on the repressive policies of its predecessor. In one form or another, he argues, the tactics have never changed.
Impressionable youth
Sary didn’t believe in the strongman style. In 1956, he brought home photos to show Rainsy, then seven years old, of Hungarian dissidents killed in a crackdown by Russian security forces. The photos made a lasting impression on him, he writes.
The fallout with Sihanouk started when Sary, who had moved his family to London to serve as ambassador, made the local papers in an embarrassing scandal. His “mistress,” who also lived with the family, had been beaten up and taken to hospital. Rainsy says his mother actually caused the injuries but his father accepted responsibility.