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Chinese naval base in Cambodia
According to a draft of the deal between Phnom Penh and Beijing, China would obtain a 30-year lease on the port, as well as a permit to station troops and storing weaponry. Two piers would be newly constructed, one for Cambodian and one for Chinese use. Chinese military personnel would be allowed to carry Cambodian passports, and Cambodians at the base would be required to get official permission from China to enter the Chinese section at the base.
យោងតាមពង្រាយឯកសារដោះដូររវាងក្រុងភ្នំពេញនិងប៉េកាំង ចិននឹងជួលកំពង់ផែរយៈពេល៣០ឆ្នាំ ក៏ដូចជាការអនុញ្ញាតអោយឈរជើងទ័ពនិងស្តុកគ្រឿងសព្វាវុធ។ ផែខ្នាតតូចពីរនឹងត្រូវកសាងឡើង មួយសម្រាប់ខ្មែរនិងមួយទៀតសម្រាប់ចិនប្រើប្រាស់។ បុគ្គលិកកងទ័ពចិននឹងត្រូវអនុញ្ញាតអោយកាន់លិខិតឆ្លងដែនខ្មែរ ហើយនៅមូលដ្ឋាននោះ ប្រជាពលរដ្ឋខ្មែរត្រូវសុំការអនុញ្ញាតពីភាគីចិនគ្រប់ពេលបើចង់ចូលទៅក្នុងមូលដ្ឋានរបស់ចិននោះ។
Chinese naval base in Cambodia
Op-Ed: by Hannah Elten , October 6, 2019
The undisclosed military pact between China and Cambodia forms another significant example of China pursuing dual-use infrastructure projects in the Asia-Pacific – while simultaneously denying the existence of such projects. Moreover, Hun Sen’s denial of the deal demonstrates that the Cambodian government, once viewed by Western countries as a potential ally in the region, is growing ever closer to China. Lastly, Chinese access to Ream base marks another step towards a looming rivalry with India in the Pacific region.
Cambodia and China have reportedly signed a secret deal allowing Chinese military troops access to the Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. While both Cambodia and China have denied such an agreement, recent statements made by US military officials stationed in the Asia-Pacific leave little doubt about the integrity of the report.
Developments and Denial
Cambodian officials, including Ministry of Defense spokesman General Chum Sutheat, were swift in their rejection of the suggestion that Beijing is allowed to establish a military presence in Cambodia. However, suspicions have long circulated the Dara Sakor resort, a $3.8 billion investment project entirely financed and built by the Chinese Union Development Group (UDG). The project is located near both the run down Ream Naval Base and the coastal town of Sihanoukville.
Several points indicate the veracity of the WSJ report: Around 70 km away from Ream, UDG is also constructing Dara Sakor airport, which is due to open next year and will contain a runway longer than the one at Phnom Penh airport, raising concerns that it is ultimately envisioned also to serve aircrafts of the Chinese Air Force. At Ream itself, satellite images show that an area inside the base has been recently cleared and a bridge at the entrance is being repaired, potentially in preparation for construction work.
According to a draft of the deal between Phnom Penh and Beijing, China would obtain a 30-year lease on the port, as well as a permit to station troops and storing weaponry. Two piers would be newly constructed, one for Cambodian and one for Chinese use. Chinese military personnel would be allowed to carry Cambodian passports, and Cambodians at the base would be required to get official permission from China to enter the Chinese section at the base.
Same, same – but different
The implementation of the alleged agreement seems to follow the rules of a playbook Beijing has previously used.
In the past, China had frequently denied plans for maritime infrastructure abroad, even when construction was already underway, such as in the case of its outpost in Djibouti and the creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea. Chinese scholars and political analysts do not use the term “base”, instead of naming facilities “strategic support points”, pointing out their commercial purpose and operation via state-owned companies (such as UDG). Yet, their dual-use potential is palpable. While they are unlikely to be capable of sustaining primary combat operations, they could almost certainly provide logistical support, such as fuel, to passing naval ships, long distances away from Chinese territory.
The Chinese-Cambodian agreement appears to be more agreeable towards China than similar agreements it has concluded in the wider region. It also reflects how dependent Hun Sen’s government has become in Beijing. Cambodia, although still the recipient of large amounts of development aid from Western countries such as the US and the EU, has increasingly sidelined its relations with these countries in favour of proximity to Beijing – most likely because its loans are coming with no strings attached with regards to human rights and functioning democratic institutions. Over the past two years alone, the Cambodian government has accepted more than $600 million in loans as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Broader geopolitical implications
On a full geopolitical scale, Chinese access to Ream has the potential to accelerate growing tensions with India in the Pacific region. Itself pursuing a deep-water port at Sambang, Indonesia, at the entrance to the Malacca Strait, India might see the advantages of its presence there reduced if China encroaches on the Strait via Cambodia, without having to rely on ships stationed at Hainan island overly.
Read More …Can the US Bring Cambodia Back from the Brink?
But the United States government wisely has two clearly delineated policies: A hardline approach to the Cambodian government, on the one hand, and a soft overture to the country’s people, on the other. The United States, by building on the latter, can take additional steps to rebuild the “people power” that Cambodians need to claim their democracy and, given domestic anti-Chinese sentiment, to potentially counter Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia.
តែអាមេរិកមានគោលនយោបាយគូសវាស់ពីរយ៉ាងច្បាស់គឺប្រើប្រាស់កំឡាំងតឹងរឹងមួយផ្នែកនិងប្រើប្រាស់កំឡាំស្រទន់ទៅរកប្រជាជនមួយផ្នែក។ សហរដ្ឋអាមេរិកដោយការខាងខិតខំផ្នែកចុងក្រោយ អាចបង្កើនជំហានទៅរកការប្រើប្រាស់អំណាចប្រជាពលរដ្ឋបន្ថែមដែលប្រជាពលរដ្ឋអាចទាមទារលទ្ធិប្រជាធិបតេយ្យត្រឡប់មកវិញនិងក្តីកង្វល់រួចប្រឆាំងចិននៅក្នុងស្រុក ដែលជាកត្តាប្រឆាំងការពង្រីកឥទ្ធិពលចិននៅអាស៊ីអាគ្នេយ៍។
FEATURES | DIPLOMACY | SOUTHEAST ASIA
Can the US Bring Cambodia Back from the Brink?
The road to democratization in Cambodia is paved with obstacles. By Charles Dunst October 01, 2019
In 1993, the United States believed Cambodia was on the path to democracy. In July of that year, Secretary of State Warren Christopher presented Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh at an event at New York’s famed Waldorf Astoria Hotel as Cambodia’s co-premiers — and as the supposed guarantors of the United Nations’ $2 billion investment in the country.
Secretary Christopher could not have been more wrong.
American support helped empower Hun Sen, who had in fact lost the 1993 elections, but nonetheless forced his way into power. Hun Sen ousted Ranariddh in 1997 and soon after eliminated the largest rival party. He then took control of the country’s security forces. Hun Sen has since consolidated power, targeted political opponents and placed himself at the center of a nationwide web of patronage.
And although Hun Sen for years maintained his profitable autocracy while balancing the United States and China, he is now leaning almost exclusively on the latter, whose backing has enabled the strongman to more firmly tighten his iron fist, further frustrating U.S. interests in the region.
Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) performed poorly in the 2013 and 2017 elections. So a CPP-controlled court banned the main opposition party in 2018; the CPP then secured 80 percent of the vote in that year’s sham elections. Hun Sen’s CPP has since “intensified its onslaught on the political opposition, civil society groups, and independent media,” per Human Rights Watch.
In the wake of Hun Sen’s crackdown, the Trump administration has thrown away the carrots and doubled up on the sticks. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama had maintained functional, although tense, relations with Hun Sen, hoping to utilize Cambodia geopolitically and salvage the international community’s investment in the country’s democracy. Trump has made no such efforts. Last year, citing “deep concerns” over “setbacks in democracy,” the White House cut aid to Cambodia, suspending funding that supported Hun Sen’s regime: the military, taxation department, and local authorities. Additionally, a bipartisan team in Congress is pushing to remove Cambodia from a preferential trade scheme for developing countries, and to sanction senior Cambodian government officials for “acts to undermine democracy in Cambodia.” (The European Union is likely to end its own preferential trade agreement with Cambodia, a move that analysts believe will “flatten” Cambodia.)
In the meantime, Cambodia has become a Chinese vassal state. Phnom Penh receives steady political support and financial aid from Beijing. In return, the Southeast Asian capital has repeatedly blocked the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in its efforts to counter China’s expansive claims to the South China Sea. Long-running rumors of a potential Chinese military base on Cambodian territory — about which U.S. Vice President Mike Pence has expressed concern — are, to some scholars, indicative of Beijing’s plans to secure hegemony over the Mekong Delta. More concretely, Phnom Penh announced on July 29 that it would increase arms purchases from China by $40 million. The Wall Street Journal’s July report that Cambodia will allow China to utilize a naval base on its soil should only further raise these concerns.
The Trump administration’s 2018 aid cuts are an effective first step in the effort to counter Hun Sen’s crackdown and frustrate the rapprochement between Cambodia and China. But the United States government wisely has two clearly delineated policies: A hardline approach to the Cambodian government, on the one hand, and a soft overture to the country’s people, on the other. The United States, by building on the latter, can take additional steps to rebuild the “people power” that Cambodians need to claim their democracy and, given domestic anti-Chinese sentiment, to potentially counter Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia.
Read More …A new ‘Trump Doctrine’ could start with Cambodia
This is not a paper “war game.” America’s military has already considered this hypothetical, and has bombed its enemies on Cambodian soil once before. This time the objective would be to remove China’s military from Southeast Asia, and more broadly the Indo-Pacific, which includes the South China Sea. A collateral effect of bombing Cambodia could be changes in power which non-violent measures, like sanctions, could not effect. America would “kill two birds with one stone.”
នេះមិនមែនជាសំណេរហ្គេមសង្រ្គាមទេ។ ទ័ពអាមេរិកធ្លាប់ពិចារណាលើការសន្និដ្ឋាននេះ ហើយបានទំលាក់គ្រាប់បែកទៅលើសត្រូវរបស់ខ្លួននៅលើទឹកដីកម្ពុជាម្តងពីមុន។ ពេលនេះ គោលបំណងគឺដើម្បីរំលាយទ័ពចិនចេញពីតំបន់អាស៊ីអាគ្នេយ៌ ដែលរួមបច្ចូលទាំងមហាសមុទ្រចិនខាងត្បូង។ ផលពីទង្វើនៃការទំលាក់គ្រាប់បែកលើទឹកដីកម្ពុជាអាចធ្វើអោយមានការផ្លាស់ប្តូរប៉ូលអំណាច នៅពេលដែលវិធានការអហឹង្សានានាដូចជាការដាក់ទណ្ឌកម្មគ្មានប្រសិទ្ធិភាព។ អាមេរិកនឹងសំឡាប់បានសត្វពីរព្រួញមួយពេលនេះ។
A new ‘Trump Doctrine’ could start with Cambodia
Op-Ed: Asia Time, By CHRISTOPHER BERES
Picture this: Somewhere in the South China Sea, which China claims as its own, a Chinese warship confronts a Philippine warship or, maybe it’s vice versa, and shots are exchanged. It doesn’t matter which warship fired first. The fight is on and the Philippines’ warship is soon joined by American warships that come to the aid of their treaty ally. China marshals its resources, calling more of its warships to join the fight.
China’s military, which has clandestine facilities in Cambodia, ostensibly for the “repair and maintenance of its warships and jet fighters,” is ready to perform its support functions. The Chinese have prepared for this eventuality, but so too have the Americans. Rather than bomb mainland China, which could escalate the territorial dispute into a world war, America bombs China’s military facilities in Cambodia and, while at the task, bombs Cambodia’s military facilities as well. After all, Cambodia is not merely China’s friend, it’s China’s military ally.
This is not a paper “war game.” America’s military has already considered this hypothetical, and has bombed its enemies on Cambodian soil once before. This time the objective would be to remove China’s military from Southeast Asia, and more broadly the Indo-Pacific, which includes the South China Sea. A collateral effect of bombing Cambodia could be changes in power which non-violent measures, like sanctions, could not effect. America would “kill two birds with one stone.”
Reality is also fraught with peril. The US is engaged in a cold war with China. China is militarizing the South China Sea. Cambodia supports China’s claims to the South China Sea. The US believes Cambodia will permit China to position troops on its territory. China provides Cambodia with nearly all of its military assistance and small arms. Cambodia has had little choice but to engage China because of the historical threat and domestically unpopular land grabs from Vietnam to its east. The Philippines’ admiralty would also like to drag the US into a fight with China. America views China as a threat to the post-World War II status quo in Asia in which the US has heretofore been pre-eminent.
And while the Cambodian government has many US-educated leaders who could be pro-US, America has not played this card to improve its relationship with Cambodia, apparently having embarked on a course of non-violent measures to punish Cambodia.
Cambodia has been unfairly subject to a punitive US foreign policy for a long time. However, America’s policy could become more interventionist in order to counter China’s possible militarization of Cambodia
Cambodia has been unfairly subject to a punitive US foreign policy for a long time. However, America’s policy could become more interventionist in order to counter China’s possible militarization of Cambodia.
The US should engage with Cambodia as an ally, do business with it, and try to influence its actions with respect to China. The carrot is better than a stick that has not worked.
The US Congress’ current policy seeks to sanction Cambodia’s leaders, to deny Cambodia access to loans from international financial institutions, to withdraw Cambodia’s trade preferences, and to elevate a defunct opposition party to the status of the legitimate government of Cambodia. President Donald Trump has appointed a new ambassador to Cambodia whose self-professed mission is to promote democracy and human rights and work with Congress to punish Cambodia. In this context, America is in effect not willing to work with the long-standing de jure government in Phnom Penh.
Unfortunately, the United States’ experience with China over the last 30 years since Deng Xiaoping’s gaige kaifang (the “Four Modernizations”) has been that over time with economic development China has not become more open but more closed and militaristic. Cambodia is open and democratic and needs friendship from a democratic partner in the West.
America’s real objective in Cambodia is not a secret and has nothing to do with freeing Kem Sokha or reviving the Cambodia National Rescue Party; rather, it is to contain China to protect America’s legitimate national-security interests. Certainly, Cambodia also has its own national-security interests to protect vis-a-vis China.
It is in both America’s and Cambodia’s best interest to negotiate a deal to contain China.
As a gesture of goodwill, the US might consider forgiving Cambodia’s war debt, which totals around US$500 million, in the amount of $50 million for every year over the next 10 years. The cost to America’s national security should China gain a military foothold in Cambodia would be much greater than $500 million.
As for Cambodia, it must know that the US is a better strategic ally than China, one that does not have the same “hidden agenda.”
A new “Trump Doctrine” for Cambodia and other parts of Southeast Asia would enable the US president to apply “the art of the deal” to disrupting the current unsuccessful US policy in the region. The Trump Doctrine would extend the Monroe Doctrine to be “the doctrine of the world” and “upset the applecart” of the failed policies of the past. As with his bipartisan consensus trade policy toward China, the goal would be to end China’s aggression in the region permanently.Asia Times is not responsible for the opinions, facts or any media content presented by contributors. In case of abuse, click here to report.
Christopher Beres is a lawyer who has represented Cambodia in international litigation. He holds a master’s degree in East Asian Studies from the University of Pennsylvania.
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nullការសាងសង់អាកាសយាន្ដដ្ឋានអន្តរជាតិមួយដោយក្រុមហ៊ុនចិនក្នុងតំបន់តារាសាគរបង្កើតឱ្យមានការព្រួយបារម្ភ
គោលបំណងរបស់ក្រុមហ៊ុននេះ គឺសាងសង់ទីក្រុងដ៏ធំថ្មីមួយរបស់កម្ពុជានៅទីនេះ ដោយមានទីក្រុងលំហែកាយជាប់ឆ្នេរសមុទ្រ សណ្ឋាគារប្រណិតៗ និងផ្ទះវីឡា សួនឧស្សាហ៍កម្ម ស្ថានីយថាមពល រោងចក្រចម្រាញ់ទឹកស្អាត និងអាគារសុខាភិបាលជាដើម។ខេត្តកោះកុង —
Read More …Chinese project in Cambodia raises alarms of military build-up
Chinese project in Cambodia raises alarms of military build-up
Op-ed: Kyodo News
Posted at Aug 12 2019 10:27 PM
While Cambodia welcomes an ongoing influx of Chinese tourists, investment and development, the world at large increasingly suspects that China is launching a military buildup in the country for stronger Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.
Dara Sakor, a new China-backed coastal resort in Koh Kong province, located some 400 kilometers southwest of Phnom Penh by road, covers almost 20 percent of the country’s coastline.
Having obtained a 99-year land lease from the Cambodian government, the Chinese developer was allowed to develop on 36,000 hectares of land in the province, raising questions about China’s intentions in Cambodia.
Washington has repeatedly shared its concerns about the matter with Cambodia’s leadership.
In November last year, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence wrote a letter to Prime Minister Hun Sen raising the issue of China’s presence and the land concession in Koh Kong awarded to Union Group.
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Felter as well as U.S. Congressman Steve Chabot also expressed concerns about the Chinese presence in Cambodia.
But both the Cambodian government and the Chinese company denied the allegations and claim there is no hidden agenda behind the massive project.
Wang Chao, vice president of Union Group, said the $3.8 billion project is part of the “One Belt and One Road Initiative” of Chinese President Xi Jinping and purely for commercial and tourism purposes.
Read More …Cambodia denies deal to allow armed Chinese forces at its naval base
Cambodia denies deal to allow armed Chinese forces at its naval base
ReutersJuly 21, 2019, 5:45 PM PDT
WASHINGTON (Reuters) – China will be able to place armed forces at a Cambodian naval base under a secret agreement the two nations have reached, the Wall Street Journal reported on Sunday, although Cambodian officials denied such a deal had been struck.
The agreement, reached this spring but not made public, gives China exclusive access to part of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand, the Journal reported, citing U.S. and allied officials familiar with the matter.
Such an arrangement would give China an enhanced ability to assert contested territorial claims and economic interests in the South China Sea, challenging U.S. allies in Southeast Asia. Chinese and Cambodian officials denied such an agreement existed, according to the Journal.
Read More …Hun Sen’s Cambodia could be in trouble
Hun Sen’s Cambodia could be in trouble
Jason Thomas 3 June 2019
His victory came after a political crackdown which saw the dissolution of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), the detention of its leader Kem Sokha, and the banning from political activity of 118 senior CNRP members.
Hun Sen has ruled Cambodia for more than 34 years, and the EU Foreign Affairs Council has deemed the recent 2018 elections as “not legitimate”.
This file photo shows Cambodian female workers sewing at a factory in Sihanouk province, some 230 kilometres southwest of Phnom Penh, Cambodia. (Tang Chhin Sothy / AFP Photo)
Op-Ed: The ASEAN Post
There is growing concern about the European Union’s (EU) proposed suspension of its Everything But Arms (EBA) trade agreement with Cambodia, a move which could set the country back years.
Established in 2001, EBA gives 49 of the world’s least developed countries tax-free access to vital EU markets for their exports except for arms and ammunition.
While the EU has always warned that EBA preferences can be removed if beneficiary countries fail to respect core United Nations (UN) and International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, there is a real threat that this could come at the cost of massive unemployment and stagnant growth in Cambodia.
Role in economy, employment
Making up 39 percent of the country’s total exports, the garment and footwear sectors employ more than 700,000 Cambodians and are the country’s largest employers. Cambodia’s exports to the EU totalled US$5.47 billion last year – more than a third of its total exports – with textiles and footwear making up the majority of that sum.
After the Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia warned of a halt in the country’s development in February due to the possible EBA suspension, the National Union Alliance Chamber of Cambodia (NUACC) last week said that the lifting of the tariff system will affect the livelihoods of about three million Cambodians.
On 2 May, a coalition of 20 international brands which source from Cambodia – including Nike, adidas and Levi Strauss – wrote a letter to Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen outlining their concerns that the labour and human rights situation in Cambodia is posing a risk to trade preferences for the country.
The EBA suspension would increase tariffs in the garment sector by 12 percent and the footwear sector by eight to 16 percent, costing US$676 million in additional taxes. The fear is that the rise in tariffs could lead to investors moving to other countries that enjoy EBA, thus affecting Cambodian jobs.
The NUACC estimated that some 43 percent of garment workers (nearly 225,000 people) and 20 percent of footwear workers (more than 20,000 people) would be left unemployed, stating that “research suggests and history demonstrates that economic sanctions lead to an increase in poverty – especially among women, minority communities and other marginalised groups.”
Why is the EBA being removed?
The EBA has led to a 630 percent increase in Cambodia’s garment and footwear exports to the EU since 2008, helping the Cambodian economy to grow by 7.5 percent in 2018 according to the World Bank. The two sectors recorded a five-year high in 2018, rising by 17.6 percent – more than double the 8.3 percent increase in 2017.
Helping to lift one-third of the country’s population out of poverty between 2007 and 2014, the garment and footwear sectors are now at risk following the EU’s decision to start an 18-month review on whether to suspend duty-free preferences in February after the European Commission called Cambodia out for its “deterioration of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.”
The EU warned Cambodia that it could lose this special status after last July’s elections kept Hun Sen in power and saw his Cambodian People’s Party win all parliamentary seats.
His victory came after a political crackdown which saw the dissolution of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), the detention of its leader Kem Sokha, and the banning from political activity of 118 senior CNRP members.
Hun Sen has ruled Cambodia for more than 34 years, and the EU Foreign Affairs Council has deemed the recent 2018 elections as “not legitimate”.
Correct approach?
Is the EBA suspension – which, if confirmed, will only come into effect in August 2020 – really the best way to address Cambodia’s poor human rights record and democratic strength?
Read More …Cambodia’s PM Hun Sen Dismisses Calls For Resignation, Vows to ‘Wage War’ on Opposition
Cambodia’s PM Hun Sen Dismisses Calls For Resignation, Vows to ‘Wage War’ on Opposition
Op-Ed: RFA, 2019-05-30
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen delivers a speech during the 25th International Conference on The Future Of Asia in Tokyo, May 30, 2019.
AFP
Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen on Thursday brushed aside calls by members of the Cambodian diaspora in Japan to resign, pledging instead to “wage war” against his country’s banned opposition party and vowing to “destroy” its acting president, Sam Rainsy.
During the third day of his May 28-31 visit to Tokyo to attend the 25th session of the Future of Asia conference, Hun Sen told regional leaders during a speech that he has no plans to step down or to back off former members of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), which Cambodia’s Supreme Court dissolved in November 2017 for its alleged role in a plot to topple the government.
“I am declaring today that we will continue to implement legal measures against those who are being charged [with crimes],” Hun Sen said, referring to members of the CNRP leadership in exile, including Sam Rainsy, who fled the country in 2016 to avoid what he says are politically motivated convictions, and has worked to gather support for the party abroad.
“Meanwhile, I am waging war against a person [Sam Rainsy] who has claimed to have established a movement in Japan, Thailand and Cambodia to stage a war against me,” he added, calling the CNRP chief “a dog that I need to destroy.”
As long as the CNRP “continues to wage a war against me, I will continue to fight them,” Hun Sen vowed.
The 2017 Supreme Court ruling banning the CNRP paved the way for Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to steamroll a general election in July last year widely seen as unfree and unfair, amid a wider crackdown on the opposition, NGOs and the independent media.
In addition to ongoing political restrictions on former CNRP officials, authorities have summoned dozens of former CNRP members in Battambang and Kampong Thom provinces for questioning in recent weeks for allegedly violating the Supreme Court decision after they were seen in public eating noodles together or had expressed support in social media posts for the party’s leaders.
Anti-Hun Sen protests
On Thursday, more than 30 members of Japan’s Cambodian diaspora held a protest outside of Hun Sen’s hotel in Tokyo, carrying banners demanding that he step down, and urging China to stop supporting his rule.
They also gathered outside of the home of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and in front of the National Diet of Japan, or parliament, shouting “Hun Sen must go” and likening him to Pol Pot, under whose 1975-79 Khmer Rouge regime an estimated 3 million Cambodians are believed to have died.
Several protesters told RFA’s Khmer Service that they had left Cambodia to find work in Japan because they lacked opportunities back home, including Nep Bora, who said she envies Japanese citizens because “their government is taking care of them.”
“Hun Sen has been in power for about 40 years, but we don’t even have enough water and electricity,” she said of Southeast Asia’s longest ruling strongman.
Others highlighted governance issues under Hun Sen’s watch that include forest destruction, land disputes, rampant corruption, and widespread poverty.
In response to Hun Sen’s comments on Thursday, Sam Rainsy told RFA that the CNRP has no intention of starting a war against the prime minister, who he labeled a “gangster” that resorts to “abusive language.”
“We don’t regard Cambodians as enemies,” he said.
“Hun Sen is waging a war against Cambodians … I am appealing to Cambodians to oppose this dictator to prevent him from destroying our nation.”
Political analyst Lao Mong Hay warned that the war of words between Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy is affecting Cambodia’s international reputation.
He also suggested that Hun Sen’s threats are part of a bid to dissuade Sam Rainsy from returning to Cambodia, as he has vowed to do this year so that he can lead the opposition to victory over the ruling party.
Members of the Cambodian diaspora in Japan display a banner used in a protest against Hun Sen in Tokyo, May 30, 2019. Credit: RFA listenersUS relations
While in Japan, Hun Sen expressed gratitude to his hosts for contributing to Cambodia’s development through financing and infrastructure, as well as investment by the Japanese private sector, and called for additional assistance from Tokyo going forward.
Read More …The injustice of Cambodian justice
Police are underpaid and short-staffed, while Cambodia’s patronage-based bureaucracy means that people tend to be promoted based on alliances, not competency or integrity.
According to the National Police, 2,969 crimes were committed last year, up from 2,817 in 2017. The number stands in contrast to the nation’s bulging prison population, however.
In November, Interior Minister Sar Kheng revealed that there were 31,008 inmates in Cambodia’s 28 prisons, of which almost 72% were being held in pre-trial detention.
That means there are roughly 190 prisoners per every 100,000 people, a bigger proportion than in most other Southeast Asian nations, and higher as a percentage than even authoritarian China.
The prison population has ballooned in recent years after the government launched in 2017 an anti-drug crackdown, similar in tone but not atrocity to the one Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has championed. As a result, the number of inmates rose by 30% in 2017 alone, mostly for drug-related offenses.
CRIME MAY 17, 2019
Op-Ed: Asia Time
Cambodian police man a barricade outside a prison in Trapaing Phlong in Tbong Khmum province on September 11, 2017. Photo: AFP / Stringer
The injustice of Cambodian justice
The government aims to appear tough on crime, seen in a bulging prison population, but ranked second worst worldwide on a recent rule of law index
ByDAVID HUTT, PHNOM PENH
Ask any Cambodian about the key issues facing their country and chances are that crime will be near the top of the list. But on nearly all counts, the country’s justice system is failing.
According to the National Police, 2,969 crimes were committed last year, up from 2,817 in 2017. The number stands in contrast to the nation’s bulging prison population, however.
In November, Interior Minister Sar Kheng revealed that there were 31,008 inmates in Cambodia’s 28 prisons, of which almost 72% were being held in pre-trial detention.
That means there are roughly 190 prisoners per every 100,000 people, a bigger proportion than in most other Southeast Asian nations, and higher as a percentage than even authoritarian China.
The prison population has ballooned in recent years after the government launched in 2017 an anti-drug crackdown, similar in tone but not atrocity to the one Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has championed. As a result, the number of inmates rose by 30% in 2017 alone, mostly for drug-related offenses.
The problem is bigger than drugs, though. The Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 2016, carried out by the Ministry of Planning’s National Institute of Statistics, found that 5% of surveyed households were victims of property crimes, such as theft and burglary.
But anecdotal evidence suggests that almost all petty crime goes unreported to the police. A 2014 United National Development Program report on sexual violence even found that the vast majority of women and men rape victims never report the crime.
“People do not trust law implementation and the justice system in Cambodia,” said Noan Sereiboth, a political blogger and frequent contributor to the youth-centered group Politikoffee.
In recent months, the government has tried to be seen as tackling higher-level crimes.
Read More …How China changed Sihanoukville
How China changed Sihanoukville
តាមអត្ថបទនេះ គម្រោងមហិច្ចិតាគំនិតផ្តួចផ្តើមផ្លូវសូត្រ(BRI)របស់ចិន កម្ចីគឺមានលក្ខណៈជាកិច្ចសន្យាគ្មានការស្មោះត្រង់(opaque contracts) អត្រាការប្រាក់ខ្ពស់ហួសហេតុ(exorbitant interest rates) ការផ្តល់កម្ចីដោយយកប្រៀបខ្លាំងលើម្ចាស់បំណុល(predatory loan practices) និងការឃុបឃិតគ្នាដោយអំពើពុករលួយ(corrupt deals)។ ជាលទ្ធផល ប្រទេសក្រីក្រជាច្រើននិងទន់ខ្សោយខាងស្ថាប័នល្អ(weak states and weak governance countries) មានបំណុលវ័ណកររើខ្លួនមិនរួមរហូតយល់ព្រមធ្វើសម្បទាលក់ឬប្រគល់ដីធ្លីក៏ដូចជាសម្បត្តិដាក់ចំណាំប្រកាន់ទៅអោយចិនទាំងដុលតែម្តង។ ចំណែកទេសចរណ៌និងវិនិយោគិនចិនវិញ និយមប្រើប្រាស់តែក្រុមហ៊ុនចិន សម្ភារៈចិន និងកម្មករចិន ដើម្បីទាក់ទាញយកលុយនោះទៅផ្តល់ផលប្រយោជន៌អោយចិនវិញ ទុកអោយប្រជាជនអ្នកមូលដ្ឋាននិងម្ចាស់ប្រទេសត្រដររស់តាមសម្មាអាជីវោខ្វះខាតដដែល។ គ្រាន់តែដើម៦ខែនៃឆ្នាំ២០១៨នេះ ជនប្រព្រឹត្តបទអាជ្ញាកម្មចិនដែលប៉ូលីសខ្មែរចាប់បានមានដល់៦៨ភាគរយនៃការចាប់សរុបទាំងអស់ទូទាំងប្រទេស។
Op-Ed: The ASEAN Post Team, 13 April 2019
Sihanoukville used to be a sleepy coastal town in south Cambodia. Its beaches were known for their quiet, cosy – albeit a little seedy – atmosphere that attracted mostly families, individual travellers and backpackers. Aside from the goings-on of the tourists and those connected with the country’s sole deep-water port, nothing much had changed over the years. That was until the Chinese investment flooded in as a result of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Cambodians Lose, As China Tourists And Cash Pour In
Fast forward to 2019 and the once-tranquil city has been transformed beyond recognition. Now an enclave of Chinese investment, Sihanoukville is peppered with Chinese-run, operated and patronised hotels, apartments towers, restaurants and gambling dens. The area is dotted with Chinatowns, festooned with neon signs in Mandarin which have taken the place of Khmer and English language signs.
The magnitude and make-up of its tourists has also changed with the new influx. Tourism increased more than 700 percent between 2012 to 2017, with Chinese tourists accounting for one-third of the 6.2 million visitors Cambodia received last year. Officials estimate that Chinese nationals make up some 90 percent of the expatriate population in Sihanoukville. A number of the long-term Western tourists living in the city have either been pushed or kicked out to make way for better paying Chinese. Some have moved out to avoid the area because of the loss of tranquillity.
Within the BRI framework, Sihanoukville is known as the first port of call on China’s massive infrastructure programme. The area, previously known as Kampong Som before it was renamed after former king Norodom Sihanouk, received US$4.2 billion in Chinese investment for power plants and offshore oil operations.
Beyond Sihanoukville, with the strong support of Prime Minister Hun Sen, the BRI has spread Chinese investment further inland into the kingdom. Cambodia is a key beneficiary of infrastructure projects under China’s trillion-dollar BRI, and this includes financing for new highways, national roads, power plants, airports, and special economic zones (SEZs) dedicated to technology innovations. China has also bequeathed US$100 million in aid to help modernise Cambodia’s military.
Chinese investment and related discontent
With the massive influx of Chinese investments, loans and aid, many have cautioned Cambodia on China’s debt-trap diplomacy. The Chinese loan model, often characterised by opaque contracts, exorbitant interest rates, predatory loan practices, and corrupt deals, has left smaller countries further debt ridden and in danger of losing their sovereignty.
The China Road and Bridge started construction of the country’s first highway last month, a US$2 billion four-lane road linking Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh. The growing dependence on China has led Hun Sen to insist that Cambodia is not a colony of China – going on to rubbish rumours that China plans to set up a naval base in the South China Sea, a strategic area which has long been an issue of contention between China and some ASEAN member nations.
Read More …The Rising Cost of Strongman Rule in Cambodia
The Rising Cost of Strongman Rule in Cambodia
Op-Ed: Project Syndicate
Apr 12, 2019 SAM RAINSY
Despite boasting unrivaled tourist attractions, large stores of natural resources that could be profitably and responsibly exploited, and one of the world’s youngest labor forces the country’s economy is floundering. And, after 34 years of Prime Minister Hun Sen’s dictatorial rule, Cambodians could soon be facing a higher price.
PARIS – On April 4, a group of international buyers’ associations from the garment, footwear, sporting, and travel goods industries sent a letter to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to express concerns over abusive labor practices and human-rights violations. Already, Cambodia’s tax-free access to the vast European Union market, granted under the EU’s Everything But Armsscheme, is in danger of being suspended over such violations.If the country is excluded permanently from EBA and other preferential trading arrangements, the associations warned, their sectors – and the Cambodian economy – will take a serious hit.
Hun Sen claims that the international community is unfairly singling out Cambodia. But the truth is that intensifying pressure on the country is consistent with a broader global shift, in which investment is increasingly guided – even dictated – by environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors.
Cambodia’s descent into dictatorship under the Hun Sen regime | Four Corners
Gone are the days when strong ESG performance was a nice bonus for investors. Pension trustees and fund managers now insist that the companies in which they invest operate in ethical, transparent ways that limit reputational risk. Investment decisions at emerging-market funds are thus increasingly preceded by rigorous ESG screenings – screenings that, after 34 years of Hun Sen’s dictatorial rule, Cambodia has no chance of passing.
Read More …Chinese tourists win, poor Cambodians lose with US$4 billion Hong Kong-backed casino in Phnom Penh
Chinese tourists win, poor Cambodians lose with US$4 billion Hong Kong-backed casino in Phnom Penh
- Tenants turfed out of Phnom Penh’s iconic low-income housing block, the White Building, were told it would be redeveloped to house Cambodians
- Instead, NagaCorp is planning a development the size of Marina Bay Sands in Singapore that it hopes will attract high-rolling Chinese gamblers
Andrew Nachemson Kong Meta , Published: 9:00am, 10 Apr, 2019
Op-Ed: This Week in Asia of SCM
Phnom Penh’s White Building, designed by Cambodian architect Vann Volyvann, before its destruction. File photoAn iconic Phnom Penh housing site known as the White Building is being turned into a multibillion-dollar casino development, as Cambodia woos Chinese tourists by catering to their penchant for gambling.Hong Kong-listed developer NagaCorp, controlled by Malaysian billionaire Chen Lip Keong, estimates it will spend US$3.8-US$4 billion on the Naga3 project, its third casino in the country, which will have hotels, condominium facilities and a 12-floor entertainment centre and outlet mall.NagaCorp’s deputy chairman Philip Lee told local media on Tuesday: “Naga3 is the single biggest private sector investment so far in the country and may be for years to come. It is about the same size as Marina Bay Sands in Singapore … which is the most expensive entertainment complex in the world.”
A Cambodian worker (R) looks through a window during demolition work at the White Building residential complex in Phnom Penh. Photo: AFPS
But the news has surprised and upset former residents of the low-income housing block and conservation activists, who had been under the impression the site was being redeveloped to house Cambodians.
Is Cambodia’s Koh Kong project for Chinese tourists – or China’s military?
Among them is Nhek Chantha, 67, who was turfed out of the White Building in 2017 and moved in with her children as she could not afford a new place.
“[The government] told such a big lie to us. It’s a very central place, they should renovate it and allow us to keep living there so it becomes a cultural site for people to see, but they think only about profit,” she said.
A Cambodian man prays to Buddhist monks at the residential complex known as the White Building before its demolition in Phnom Penh. Photo: AFPS
A Japanese company, Arakawa Co Ltd, was supposed to rebuild the landmark site and turn it into a 21-storey condominium block. Five of the floors were to be reserved for low-income housing that would go to the previous residents of the White Building and 12 floors would be used for private flats. Land Management Minister Chea Sophara in 2016 had asked Cambodians to “be patient while waiting for the new White Building to be finished in four years”.
‘They only go to Chinese shops’: why Cambodia’s influx of mainland tourists is causing tensions
Arakawa did not respond to requests for comment on Monday and Land Ministry spokesman Seng Lot said he did not know how or why the land was transferred to NagaCorp.
Constructed in 1963 as part of the Bassac River Front cultural complex and overseen by legendary architect Vann Molyvann, the White Building was, along with the rest of the city, evacuated in 1975 by the ultra-Maoist Khmer Rouge occupation which targeted artists and intellectuals.
A Cambodian boy walks past spirit houses at the residential complex known as the White Building in Phnom Penh before its demolition. Photo: AFPS
After the regime fell in 1979, a mixed crowd including artists and musicians moved in, turning it into a colourful and close-knit, if sometimes seedy, community until the government demolished it two years ago, saying it was not structurally sound.
Read More …Interview: Book Author’s 10-Year Observation of Cambodia
Interview: Book Author’s 10-Year Observation of Cambodia
09 March 2019
My book is exactly about “Cambodia in the 21st century”. I thought the book could include some kind of photos of Cambodian society now. What is happening and what is changing, from a traditional to a more modern society.PHNOM PENH —
[Editor’s Note: Marc Baudinet, author of “Cambodia In The Twenty First Century: A Short Social Study”, sat down with VOA Khmer’s Ky Mengly to share the key takeaways from his recently published work and his observations of the country, from the state of the rule of law to domestic politics, foreign policy and socio-economic progress.]
VOA: How long did you spend researching and writing this book?
Baudinet: I came here the first time in 2010. I come from Europe. Everything was very different, quite amazing compared to where I come from. And I was struck straight away by how different things are and how I couldn’t quite understand how people interacted. So, I wanted to know more about that and I started doing interviews, asking people questions in a very informal ways. Why’s this and why’s that? And much later basically three years ago, I thought I could write something about how Cambodians are changing fast. Therefore, it would be interesting to observe Cambodian society now. That’s how I got the idea to do the book. And it took me two and a half years to write this.
VOA: Can you tell us briefly what your book is about?
Baudinet: My book is exactly about “Cambodia in the 21st century”. I thought the book could include some kind of photos of Cambodian society now. What is happening and what is changing, from a traditional to a more modern society. People’s education is improving, more people are going to school, people are buying cars, mobile phones, and people are getting jobs that never really existed here before. So, there is a lot happening in this society and this is my point really. And how is that affecting the traditional society? What are the consequences on how people interact? All of these interest me and basically that’s my reason why I wrote the book.
VOA: In the book you seem to lack optimism about the current Cambodian government. Why is that?
Baudinet: So, I started writing the book in 2016 and everyone was talking about the Commune Elections in 2017 and the General Elections in 2018 and I thought that many people were quite optimistic that things could change and then suddenly there were upheavals. Everything took a different path in November 2017. The rule of law is a key aspect of a successful society. If you take Singapore and Singapore’s rule of law is very strong, meritocracy is very strong, good governance is very strong and that society is very successful. Here, the rule of law is shaky. It is very much about having more money than whoever is against you. Therefore, there is a problem for people to trust in their own society and have the courage to invest for instance when they know possibly that the law is not on their side because they’re not rich enough for instance. Meritocracy is also very important. It is improving I think. I think that there are many problems. I think as education is improving, meritocracy is also more valued than a few years ago. So, this is very good for the future. However, there is still a long way to go. So, I’m sometimes optimistic and sometimes a bit pessimistic here.
VOA: You mention in the book that the “natural order” in Cambodia does not sit well with democracy. What do you mean by that?
Baudinet: The idea of democracy … is that basically every individual every person has the same rights and has the same value. No matter whether they’re a cleaner, a poor farmer, they’re as important as rich land owners or rich business persons. Everyone, when people vote, everyone is the same. Equality is very much the key or let’s say not the key but the grounding within which democracy can grow. Now here in the traditional society in Asia in general not only in Cambodia, the idea that everybody is equal is not part of a traditional understanding of how a society functions. People accept that there is an elite and then there are a lot of other people and those people should just do their work and not challenge authority. Therefore, here I think in terms of democracy, the idea that everyone is equal, is possibly not yet accepted, especially by of course the elites.
VOA: Towards the end of the book you draw a comparison between King Ang Duong’s embrace of France and Prime Minister Hun Sen’s embrace of China. What is the implication of this?
Baudinet: Geopolitics is very much a power game between different players; some are big players and some are smaller players. Cambodia, in the 19th century, had a lot of problems with its two bigger neighbors: Vietnam and Thailand. For Cambodia, the king decided to call a third power to somehow help. But there was a price that possibly the king did not realize. Cambodia became a colony, lost its independence. Now of course, the situation is very different. The context is vastly different from those days. However geopolitics remains of course a power game. I was wondering whether the way Cambodia today is possibly giving too much to China or a lot to China. Is it going to affect in the longer term prospects of Cambodia’s independence. Not that China is going to colonize Cambodia. No, those days are over. But there are other ways to manipulate or influence smaller countries.
Read More …Cambodia’s Money Laundering Relisting Shows Dangers of Corrupt Institutions
Cambodia’s Money Laundering Relisting Shows Dangers of Corrupt Institutions
By Sam Rainsy -March 5, 2019, Op-Ed: The Geopolitics
The global money laundering watchdog Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in February put Cambodia on its “grey” watchlist because of concerns over money laundering. The decision highlights the need for concerted international action against a corrupt and repressive regime that provides a haven for dubious cash flows.
Cambodia was removed from the FATF grey list in 2015. Being relisted again so quickly indicates the speed of the deterioration in Cambodia’s governance, and the dangers of being misled by a corrupt regime. The grey list can be the path to the blacklist, reserved for pariahs such as North Korea. Pakistan was put on the grey list in June 2018 and warned it may be blacklisted by October 2019 if it does not curb money laundering and terror financing. Cambodia will find it much harder to get off the greylist for a second time.
Money from opaque sources continues to flow into Cambodia’s casinos, banks and the real estate market. Yet the FATF noted in its decision that no money-laundering case has ever been prosecuted in Cambodia, and that the country has made minimal use of financial intelligence to investigate money laundering and terrorism financing. These failures must be seen in the context of Cambodia’s highly corrupt institutions. The country was ranked an abysmal 161 out of 180 countries surveyed by Transparency International in its 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index. The Rule of Law Index for 2019 published by the World Justice Project placed Cambodia at 125 out of 126.
Cambodia has been stuck at the bottom of these rankings for many years. The government exists as a front for an operation to strip the country of its natural resources for private gain. It has evicted huge numbers of Cambodians from their land with no regard for their rights and scant interest in their well-being. This is done to secure the access of the powerful to the country’s natural resources, such as rubber, timber, sugar and sand. The absence of the rule of law also makes Cambodia a haven for international criminals. Maritime vessels using the Cambodian flag have done so as a cover not only for illegal fishing but drug trafficking, petrol smuggling and arms trading.
Read More …EU plays tough with Cambodia
EU plays tough with Cambodia
Op-Ed: Japan Time
Concerned by ongoing human rights abuses, the European Union has threatened to suspend Cambodia’s preferential access to its market. Cambodia responded by lashing out, warning that EU action could prompt the Phnom Penh government to crack down even harder on its enemies. The EU should not be deterred: The Cambodian government should be held to account for its human rights practices and its privileges rescinded if they violate commonly accepted standards. Other countries should support the EU’s message and policies.
Under its “everything but arms” (EBA) arrangement, all imports (except weapons) from developing countries are given duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market. The program has been a boon to Cambodia since joining in 2001. Overall, the EU is Cambodia’s biggest market, taking about 40 percent of its exports. Most of those products are in the garment sector: According to Cambodia’s Ministry of Commerce, textile shipments to the EU topped $1.6 billion in the first six months of 2018. In contrast, exports to the United States were about half as much — $858 million — and together the two markets comprise 72 percent of the country’s exports in that industry.
The Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia estimated that suspension of EBA would increase tariffs by 12 percent in the garment sector and by 8 to 17 percent for footwear. That could mean an additional $676 million in taxes on Cambodian textile exports, which would have a powerful impact on sales. The association warned that suspension of the EBA benefits would hit rural women hardest, as they make up about 85 percent of the country’s 700,000 garment workers.
That is a real risk, but the EU, like other countries that value democracy and human rights, cannot afford to ignore blatant abuses perpetrated by the government of Prime Minister Hun Sen.
The EU action was forced by last year’s general election, a ballot in which Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party won 125 of the 125 seats contested in the National Assembly. That outcome was inevitable after the Cambodian Supreme Court dissolved the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), the leading opposition party, and banned 118 party members — including party leader Kem Sokha — for allegedly plotting with the United States to take power (a charge they and the U.S. government deny). Kem Sokha was unlikely to pose much of a threat as he was in prison on treason charges. He was released after the vote but remains under house arrest. Many other senior party leaders have fled the country.
Read More …Reversing Cambodia’s democratic drift
Reversing Cambodia’s democratic drift
Op-Ed: East Asia Forum
14 February 2019
One viable approach to halting the degeneration of Cambodia’s ersatz democracy is to engage in channels of dialogue at both national and international levels. At the national level, it is imperative to resume the culture of dialogue between the ruling CPP and the dissolved CNRP.
ដំណោះស្រាយទៅបានដោយរលូនមួយដើម្បីទប់ស្កាត់ការលូតលាស់នៃប្រជាធិបតេយ្យគ្រាន់តែជាត្រីមុខរបស់កម្ពុជាគឺការបន្តជជែកគ្នានៅគ្រប់កំរិតថ្នាក់ទាំងអស់ ទាំងថ្នាក់ជាតិនិងអន្តរជាតិ។ នៅថ្នាក់ជាតិ វាសំខាន់ចាំបាច់ដើម្បីសើរើវប្បធម៍សន្ទនារវាងគណបក្សប្រជាជនគ្រប់គ្រងអំណាចនិងគណបក្សសង្គ្រោះជាតិដែលត្រូវបានរំលាយ។ ការសន្ទនាកំរិតអន្តរជាតិទាមទារការចូលរួមនិងការសហការពីតួអង្គខាងក្រៅសំខាន់ៗដែលមានអានុភាពពិសេសទៅលើទិដ្ឋភាពសេដ្ឋកិច្ចនិងនយោបាយកម្ពុជា មានដូចជាសហរដ្ឋអាមេរិក សហគមអុឺរ៉ុប និងចិន។ តួអង្គដ៏ទៃទៀតដូចជាអូស្ត្រាលី ជប៉ុន និងអាស៊ានក៏ជាតួអង្គសំខាន់ផងដែរ។ តាមរយៈនីតិវិធីនៃការពិភាក្សានិងចរចារទាំងនេះ ទិសដៅនៃលទ្ធិប្រជាធិបតេយ្យរបស់កម្ពុជា ដែលមនុស្សភាគច្រើនយល់ថាកំពុងធ្លាក់ទៅក្នុងរបបផ្តាច់ការ អាចនឹងត្រូវបានរស់រានឡើងវិញ។
Dialogue at the international level requires participation and coordination from key external players that have significant leverage over Cambodia’s political and economic landscape, such as the United States, the European Union and China. Other players like Australia, Japan and ASEAN are also important.
Through these channels of discussion and negotiation the course of Cambodia’s democracy, perceived by many as a drift towards autocratic rule, can be reversed.
Authors: Kimkong Heng, University of Queensland and Veasna Var, UNSW Canberra
Cambodia is drifting towards autocracy with a clear trend. An unprecedented crackdown on independent media, civil society and the country’s major opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), hardly suggest otherwise. Whether Hun Sen’s government likes it or not, similar observations about Cambodia will continue to emerge.
Although 19 smaller parties participated in the July 2018 national elections, commentators and observers questioned the credibility of the election. Some called it a sham. Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) was unchallenged in the election, allowing the CPP to secure a predictable landslide victory. The party won all 125 parliamentary seats.
Hun Sen’s recent political moves have not gone unnoticed. The United States has placed sanctions on high-ranking Cambodian government officials. The European Union has begun a formal procedure to withdraw its Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preferences. And the Australian and Japanese governments have raised concerns over the dissolution of the main opposition party.
Now, as international pressure mounts, Cambodia’s political tensions seem to be easing. In December 2018 the Cambodian National Assembly amended the Law on Political Parties, paving the way for the 118 banned CNRP politicians to return to politics.
It remains to be seen whether all CNRP officials will request political rehabilitation. So far, only two have. If this trend continues, a division within the opposition between supporters of acting CNRP President Sam Rainsy and former CNRP president Kem Sokha, who was arrested in 2017 prior to the party’s dissolution, may become more severe and lead to a split.
Sam Rainsy, who lives in self-imposed exile, recently announced that he would return to Cambodia this year to fight for change and democracy. He even challenged Hun Sen to a bet over the likelihood of Kem Sokha’s release amid mounting international pressure. He faces imprisonment if he loses, but if he wins Hun Sen has agreed to step down from power.
The high-stakes wager reflects the country’s political dysfunction and could result in a lose-lose situation for both prominent Cambodian political figures. Hun Sen may come under more criticism and Sam Rainsy could further damage his already compromised integrity if they fail to stick to the terms of their political wager. As it stands, it seems likely that Sam Rainsy will try to take advantage of the situation to return to Cambodia, resume his political career and put more pressure on Hun Sen’s government.
The direction of Cambodia’s political development remains unclear amid talk of Sam Rainsy’s return and the possibility of senior CNRP officials returning to politics. Despite this uncertainty, Prime Minister Hun Sen and his ruling elites hold the key to relieving the political deadlock and putting the deteriorating democracy back on track.
Read More …Why Hun Sen needs China now more than ever
Why Hun Sen needs China now more than ever
Pending US and EU sanctions threaten to sink Cambodia’s economy. Will China come to the rescue?
Op-Ed: Asia Time
By DAVID HUTT, PHNOM PENH
In multiple and mounting ways, from aid to trade to diplomatic protection, China keeps its geopolitical ally Cambodia afloat. That patron-client relationship was on full display late last month when Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen made a hat-in-hand four-day state visit to Beijing.
The leader came away with what he sought: More money, more promises and more comradely assurances. Beijing reportedly pledged to provide Cambodia with US$588 million in aid over the next three years, to import 400,000 tons of rice, increase bilateral trade from $5.7 billion last year to $10 billion in 2023, and broadly more investment.
“At present, China-Cambodia relations are facing new development opportunities,” China state-media outlet Xinhua quoted President Xi Jinping as saying after his meeting with Hun Sen last week. Hun Sen, for his part, wrote in a post-visit Facebook post that Xi “praised [China’s] special cooperation with Cambodia and vowed to make the relationship even stronger” and that its future development assistance for that country will be “twice more solid.”
China’s patronage is arguably more important now than ever, as the United States (US) moves to sanction Hun Sen’s regime and the European Union (EU) looks to withdraw the country from its duty-free Everything But Arms (EBA) trade scheme. Both are punitive responses to Cambodia’s recent democratic retreat, exemplified by the dissolution of country’s main opposition party in November 2017, a move that drove many of its members into exile.
Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) thus won all the seats in the National Assembly at last July’s general election, a result many Western observers and governments saw as rigged and illegitimate. The CPP has claimed that any Western criticism of its rule is an assault on the country’s sovereignty and insult to its independence, claims the long-ruling party has played up to nationalistic effect.
China, it seems, is now backing that anti-Western narrative. Its new ambassador to Cambodia, Wang Wentian, recently asserted that Western nations want to “attack the cooperation between Cambodia and China.” Geopolitical shifts partly explain why Beijing has appeared to indulge the Cambodian government’s worst anti-democratic instincts and move to a de facto one-party state after years of Western-favored multi-party democracy.
Elections last year in Pakistan, Maldives and Malaysia all saw skeptics of China’s $1 trillion infrastructure-building Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) rise to democratic power. Other regional countries have also started to air misgivings or stalled on BRI-related projects. While some reports of BRI downsides and debt traps have been exaggerated, there is a rising regional backlash against Chinese investments that are perceived to erode nations’ sovereignty and finances.
Xi stressed at a high-level symposium to mark the BRI’s fifth anniversary held in Beijing last August that its projects aim to “improve the global governance system” and build a world “community of shared destiny.” It’s a message China aims in particular for neighboring Southeast Asia, where big BRI plans for connecting infrastructure to promote and facilitate more regional trade are on the drawing board.
Read More …Is Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Heading in the Right Direction?
Is Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Heading in the Right Direction?
Cambodia needs to recalibrate its relationships with the US and EU, or risk becoming overly reliant on China.
Op-Ed: The Diplomat
By Kimkong Heng, February 08, 2019
Cambodia’s foreign policy has seen remarkable improvements after 1993 when the country held its UN-organized national election. The Cambodian government’s efforts to integrate Cambodia into the region and the world have resulted in Cambodia’s membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1999 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2004. The Kingdom has overall had good relations with its neighbors and other countries in Southeast Asia and beyond.
However, as a small state Cambodia has limited strategic space to maneuver and its foreign policy dynamics face considerable challenges. The country is seen to lean toward China, its closest ally and its largest economic and military benefactor, at the expense of good relations with other countries. Cambodia’s close embrace of China has become more evident since 2012. From blocking ASEAN joint statements to supporting Beijing’s One China policy, Cambodia continues to demonstrate its willingness to embrace China. In turn, China has reciprocated through increasing “no strings attached” aid and loans to Cambodia.
Both countries upgraded their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010, and as of now China is Cambodia’s largest foreign direct investor. The trade volume between the two countries was valued at $5.8 billion in 2017, by which time China had given approximately $4.2 billion to Cambodia in the form of aid and soft loans.
While Cambodia is seen to enjoy its reciprocal relationship with the world’s second largest economy, its relations with the West look set to deteriorate.
Following the dissolution of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) in 2017 and the controversial national election in 2018, which saw the ruling party sweep all seats in the National Assembly, Cambodia’s ties with the United States reached a new low. The United States has imposed visa sanctions on high-ranking Cambodian government officials, withdrawn aid commitments, and further imposed financial sanctions, including asset freezes on the commander of Prime Minister Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit. The Cambodian ruling elites have condemned these sanctions and have repeatedly made reference to the U.S. bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War, rhetoric Hun Sen’s government has often used to criticize the US.
Cambodia’s ties with the European Union now also face challenges. The EU has begun the internal process to withdraw its Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preferences from Cambodia, a move the European bloc initiated in response to the Cambodia government’s perceived lack of commitment to improve its human, labor, and political rights situation. In return, Cambodia issued a communiqué calling the EU trade threat an extreme injustice. The EU has been also accused of using double standards in its treatment of Cambodia. Further, Prime Minister Hun Sen has recently warned that he would put an end to the opposition party if the EU withdraws the EBA from Cambodia.
Cambodia’s foreign policy toward the United States and the EU, analyzed in terms of recent developments, appears not to be heading in the right direction. It is not wise for Cambodia, as a small developing country, to fight against or alienate itself from the world’s largest economy and the world’s largest trading bloc. Although the Cambodian government may have strong support from China, its current approach toward the United States and the EU will not be helpful in the long run. It is certainly better to have friends on both sides of the world, rather than adopt a one-sided orientation toward friendship and foreign policy.
Hun Sen and his ruling elites’ powerful narratives of war, peace, development, poverty reduction, independence, and sovereignty are well developed and seem to be well received by many Cambodians who have first- or even second-hand experience of the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge. Most Cambodians, if not all, would not like to experience or hear about war or social instability again at all. However, they also expect more from their country and leaders. In addition to peace and stability, they have a strong desire for better opportunities, freedom, and human rights. They want to see many social issues being addressed. While they are hopeful for the future of Cambodia, they may also be worried about a possible worst-case scenario where their country may fall victim to a new cold war in Southeast Asia. Specifically, it is conceivable that Cambodia may become an object of strategies used by China and the United States in their competition for dominance in the international system and in Southeast Asia in particular.
Cambodia’s close alignment with China, although important for Cambodia’s economic development and the ruling elites’ legitimacy, does not seem to bring about sustainable and inclusive development for all. Chinese investment, aid, and loans are generally directed at the government and the Cambodian elites. Unlike the Chinese way, the Western approach to aid, loans, and investment projects is usually channelled through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aimed at benefiting ordinary Cambodians. Although the number and amount of aid and development projects from the West are few, when compared with a large and increasing number of the Chinese investment projects, they are usually seen to promote accountability, sustainability, and inclusiveness. Chinese investment projects, however, tend to lack transparency and accountability, leading to many environmental and social issues in Cambodia. Thus, the impact of China’s development projects on the sustainable development of Cambodia is still an open question.
Read More …WHO GAVE THAILAND’S EX-PM YINGLUCK SHINAWATRA A CAMBODIAN PASSPORT?
- Officials insist Thailand’s former leader Yingluck Shinawatra hasn’t been given a Cambodian passport
- So how she used one to register a company in Hong Kong is a mystery that points to the ‘highest levels’, observers say
Op-Ed: South China Morning Post (SCMP)
BY PHILA SIUJOHN POWER 26 JAN 2019
Thailand’s former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Photo: AFP
The news that Thailand’s former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra is in possession of a Cambodian passport poses a troubling question for many of her new-found compatriots: who gave it to her? The self-exiled leader, who fled Thailand in August 2017 before being sentenced to prison on what she says are politically motivated charges, used a Cambodian passport to register as the sole director of a Hong Kong company incorporated in August last year – as revealed by the South China Morning Post.
Source SCMP
The red passport emblazoned with the words “Kingdom of Cambodia” in gold might not be what anyone would expect Yingluck Shinawatra, former prime minister of Thailand, to present at an immigration checkpoint.
With visa-free or visa-on-arrival access to just 54 destinations worldwide, it is ranked among the least powerful passports in the world by the annual Henley Passport Index, at a lowly No. 84 out of 104.
Officially, anyone with US$300,000 to spare can pick up a Cambodian passport. That is what Cambodia requests as an investment before handing out its travel document.
Yingluck, in self-exile since 2017, before Thailand’s supreme court sentenced her to five years in prison for mishandling rice subsidies, used a Cambodian passport to register herself as sole director of a Hong Kong company incorporated last August last year, according to official filings. The disclosure, in a South China Morning Post story this month, added to the theory that she fled Thailand via Cambodia.
It also put the spotlight on the ease with which the world’s wealthy can obtain new passports or residency in a new country if they have the cash it takes – anything between US$100,000 and US$2 million.
This can all be above board and properly regulated, with thorough screening of applicants. In some cases, however, getting a new passport has been said to be as easy as shopping online, and the individual does not even have to show up in person.
Some get new passports by bribing officials.
“For some investors, they want to move to somewhere else because they truly want to do business there,” said Benny Cheung Ka-hei, director of the Goldmax Immigration Consulting in Hong Kong. “But then of course, some of the rich Chinese have too much money to spare and have no problems spending a few million dollars on foreign passports. They want foreign passports as protection, and also for showing off.”
But Phnom Penh has denied that Yingluck holds a Cambodian passport and observers question whether there has been a royal decree conferring citizenship on her – something that is required of all other foreigners.
Cambodia denies it issued a passport to former Thai prime minister
Mu Sochua, vice-president of the banned Cambodia National Rescue Party, said she did not believe Cambodian officials’ claims they were not aware of Yingluck’s Cambodian passport.
“There are many, many issues in terms of legality and sovereignty as far as Cambodia is concerned … where is the royal decree? No citizenship can be issued without a royal decree, and to get a passport from any country, you need to be a citizen of that country,” said Sochua, who fled her own country in 2017.
Mu Sochua, vice-president of the Cambodia National Rescue Party. Photo: Reuters
Sochua demanded Cambodia’s strongman Prime Minister Hun Sen investigate.
“Isn’t he concerned that an ex-prime minister holds a passport of his country? And if he has not ordered it, then who has? Who ordered the passport to be issued?
“For Yingluck, an ex-minister of Thailand, I don’t think an official at the Ministry of Interior or the Foreign Ministry would dare to [issue it] – even if she wanted to buy it for a million dollars.”
Sochua believes Yingluck received the passport because of her ties with Hun Sen. Yingluck’s brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, also a former prime minister of Thailand in self-imposed exile, used to be an adviser to the Cambodian government.
Cambodia launches crackdown on passports
“The Thai junta government has collaborated with the Hun Sen regime in deporting Cambodian political asylum seekers to Cambodia. The question is: will the Thai junta ask Hun Sen to seek the deportation of Yingluck if and when she travels with the Cambodian passport?” added Sochua.
Sophal Ear, associate professor of diplomacy and world affairs at the Occidental College in Los Angeles, said the decision to grant Yingluck a passport must have come from “the highest levels” of the Cambodian government.
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. Photo: AP
Read More …Cambodia: A Country for Rent
Cambodia: A Country for Rent
Richard Bernstein FEBRUARY 21, 2019 ISSUE
Not that it should have been a surprise, but China was the only major country that declined to join the international criticism of Cambodia’s prime minister, Hun Sen, as he ensured that he would run effectively unopposed in the parliamentary elections on July 29, 2018, turning them into a sham and largely dismantling what remained of Cambodia’s democratic structures. Among Hun Sen’s actions was the arrest and imprisonment on transparently ridiculous charges of Kem Sokha, the leader of the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), the only opposition party capable of challenging his rule. That occurred just after midnight on September 3, 2017, when some one hundred armed police descended on Kem’s Phnom Penh home and hauled him off to a rural prison near the Vietnamese border, where he remained for a year before being released on bail to await trial. With the only other Cambodian opposition figure of national stature, Sam Rainsy, living in enforced exile, Hun Sen had no credible challenger in the elections. His party won all 125 seats in the National Assembly.
There were other acts of brazen and undisguised repression that provoked the disapproval of much of the world apart from China. Cambodia’s main English-language newspaper, The Cambodian Daily, which had done good professional reporting on the country for twenty-four years, training a generation of Cambodian journalists in the process, was closed down on dubious charges of tax evasion. NGOs, including the National Democratic Institute, which is affiliated with the Democratic Party in the US, were expelled from the country. Most important, perhaps, Hun Sen’s compliant Supreme Court, two months after Kem’s arrest, dissolved the CNRP and banned 118 of its senior figures from politics for five years.
The purpose of this repression is obvious. Kem and his party had performed well in parliamentary elections six years ago despite the ruling party’s efforts to manipulate them, including the occasional unsolved murder and attacks on opposition rallies. In 2017 the CNRP received 44 percent of the vote in local elections, compared to 49 percent for Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party. Given the widespread disaffection with Hun Sen and his corrupt cohort, especially among younger voters, many Cambodian and foreign observers believed that if the July 29 vote had been free and fair, Kem might well have won, thereby unseating Hun Sen after thirty-three years in power.
Read More …Cambodia’s Geopolitics at High Risk
Cambodia vs. Venezuala
Again, Cambodia is risking itself by the power-thirst leader to plunge this country into another chapter of chaos and uncertainty. After the jailing opposition leader Kem Sokha in September 2017, the dissolving largest political party Cambodia National Rescue Party in November 2017, and banned the 118 opposition politicians from politics; the government paved way for its own party to the election to sweep all 125 parliamentary seats. The election was a sham and no democratic countries has recognized this poll.
The situation today of Cambodia is not different from Venezuela’s. While dictator Nicolas Maduro banned opposition party from taking part in the election, Cambodian government through its extending hand ie. the supreme court dissolved the opposition party CNRP from the political space disrespectful to the nearly half of country’s population who have voted for this party.
Siding with China solely is not only violating Cambodia’s Constitution but poking America’s eyes
Cambodia’s slide toward autocracy, which culminated in the Cambodian People’s Party’s retention of power and complete dominance of the national legislature, opens the way for a constitutional amendment that could lead to a Chinese military presence in the country.
ការរអិលចូលទៅក្នុងរបបផ្តាច់ការរបស់កម្ពុជា ដែលរុញដល់កំពូលក្នុងការកាន់កាប់អំណាចរបស់គណបក្សប្រជាកម្ពុជានិងការគ្រប់គ្រងទាំងស្រុងនៃរដ្ឋសភាជាតិ បើកផ្លូវសម្រាប់ការធ្វើវិសោធនកម្មច្បាប់រដ្ឋធម្មនុញ្ញដែលអាចនាំទៅរកវត្តមានយោធាចិនក្នុងប្រទេស។
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The Human Rights Committee in Cambodia is the Protector of the Government not the People’s Rights
Keo Remy, the chair of Cambodia Human Rights Committee read his statement with a high praise and proud privileges for the government in which undermines itself from key objectives, code of conduct and professionalism. This is the anatomy of single-party state governance including the ACU, the Assembly, the Judiciary, and the Arm-force etc.
Cambodia Review – 32nd Session of Universal Periodic Review, 30 Jan 2019 – UPR of Cambodia